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ABSTRACT 
 
Katherine Meizel, Advisor 
 
What do you value most about your voice? 
As ethnomusicological studies of the voice expand, so must our understanding of 
what voice even means. Voice must entail more than just a sonic phenomenon, but must 
also relate to ideology, to our very identity, even. This thesis will fuse 
ethnomusicological and legal perspectives to explore how American and, to a lesser 
extent, international copyright law and other legal mechanisms protect more than just a 
musician’s economic interest, but also his very identity. I will explore the right of 
publicity and the concept of moral rights and how they relate to voice and identity. The 
right of publicity is a musician’s right to protect his identity as well as his copyrighted 
works while moral rights is the right of a musician to prevent certain uses of his work 
even when he has assigned the copyright of that work to another. This thesis will suggest 
a theoretical framework for investigating the voice as an intangible legal marker of 
identity. 
This thesis will examine where copyright law protects identity and where it falls 
short and how the right of publicity fills in the gaps to provide comprehensive protection 
for a musician’s voice in the broadest sense. It will provide a background on the scope of 
copyright law, as well as how it has historically developed to protect more than just 
work-product, but also the musician’s very identity.  It will then explore the right of 
publicity and moral rights and how those ideas fit into the general legal scheme of 
 iv 
copyright protection. I will accomplish this through interviews with musicians, as well as 
explorations of current scholarly work on identity, copyright, voice, the right of publicity, 
and moral rights. I will also explore important legal cases and relevant statutes in these 
areas, such as Tom Waits v. Frito-Lay, Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company and the 
Copyright Act of 1976. These explorations can help us understand how musicians can 
protect their identity by protecting their ideological, as well as their physical, voices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What defines a musician? 
It is difficult enough to define any human being, but musicians, and other celebrities, are 
especially difficult because of the unique place they hold in society. Musicians spend tremendous 
amounts of time and money to create an identity to present to their fans. Their fans, in turn, base 
their opinions about those musicians upon those portrayed identities. 
In this thesis, I will explore identity from the standpoint of musicians, consider the 
influences that shape and inform their identity creation and perpetuation, and explore the ways in 
which musicians can protect their identities from exploitation. I accomplish this by studying 
identity and how the legal system, both at home and abroad, functions to protect identity for 
musicians. This is most salient when a third party co-opts a musician’s identity in some way that 
impugns that musician’s reputation or belief system, usually by using that identity in advertising. 
This belief system may not only shape that musician’s identity, but also lends to their credibility 
and, therefore, their influence amongst their fan base. Reputation, then, becomes not only a 
primary ethical concern for musicians, but also a significant economic one. 
As I began my fieldwork for this project, a couple of things surprised me. My initial plan 
was to interview Bette Midler, Tom Waits, and other celebrity musicians who were associated 
with product endorsement. I reached out to the representatives of dozens of such musicians from 
the ones I just noted to Taylor Swift, Demi Lovato, Ingrid Michaelson, CeeLo Green, and others. 
When I heard back from a total of three of them, all denials, I was forced to lower my sights a bit 
and approach local and regional musicians instead. 
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I interviewed seven musicians, six of whom were primarily operating on the creative side 
of the spectrum and one of whom worked both as a musician and as a producer. Sarah is a jazz 
vocalist who has released two albums and has composed multiple songs protected by copyright. 
Ben is a jazz clarinetist and big band leader who has released several recordings under a smaller 
jazz-based label. Tom is also a big band leader who has released several albums, but whose work 
has been used in multiple regional television commercials. Matt is a folk rock guitarist and singer 
who has recorded albums both with his band and as a solo artist and has also been featured in 
multiple regional commercials. Norah is also a jazz vocalist who has recorded one album with a 
small, local label, but has appeared on other albums as a background vocalist. Will is a jazz 
guitarist and vocalist who has recorded his own albums, but has also worked for record labels as 
a producer. Finally, Steve is the front man for a rock band signed to a major label that has 
released several albums containing original music. One of their songs is currently the theme of a 
successful television series on a major cable network. Each of these informants has had different 
types of exposure to record companies on multiple levels, providing a reasonably broad range of 
perspectives. 
Going into these interviews, I expected my informants to have given the concepts I was 
asking about, such as identity and voice, very little thought, but to know quite a bit about 
copyright law, which is, after all, their bread and butter. I was surprised, though, at how 
considered and developed some of their ideas were on the theoretical concepts, but also with how 
little some of them knew about copyright law. 
This helped reinforce the importance of fieldwork to me. There is no reason I couldn’t 
have done this project without fieldwork. Concrete examples certainly help to reinforce ideas by 
grounding them in the real world, but this thesis had some concrete examples built in, so I 
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believe the project still would have been meaningful without fieldwork. What that type of 
approach lacks, though, is dialogue. 
The dialogues I had with my informants helped me to understand the musician’s 
perspective in a more nuanced way than what I could get from the work of others. Of course, 
when you rely upon someone else’s work, you’re limited to the questions they thought to ask and 
their perspectives. Having the freedom to explore my own ideas in my own way was far more 
meaningful to me in terms of understanding my object. In fact, my fieldwork led directly to some 
of the most important ideas in this thesis. 
I chose to keep my informants’ identities confidential. While I did not ask all of the 
informants whether they wanted to remain anonymous, during an interview, one of the 
informants had expressed a concern regarding disclosing his identity. He was a musician, but 
also worked in management on the production side of the business. I interviewed him at the same 
time as another of my informants and they both expressed concern that if record companies 
found out about their interviews and didn’t like what they said, it would negatively impact their 
professional lives. Honestly, I don’t know whether those concerns were founded or just mild 
paranoia, but they seemed legitimate enough to support my decision to keep all of the 
informants’ identities confidential. After all, none of my informants were big names who might 
be able to stand up to a record company and I did not want to risk any potential adverse 
professional repercussions for them, so it seemed like the safe route. Especially on an issue as 
divisive between musicians and record companies as copyright. If an informant wanted to take a 
public stand, that would have been one thing. If not, the risk seemed real enough for me to be 
cautious and I kept their identities secret. 
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The second thing that surprised me was how incomplete my theory was going into my 
fieldwork. I was working with the negative voice, a theory I had previously developed, so first, I 
had to justify where that theory came from and why it was different from what was out there 
already. After all, Mladen Dolar, for example, did talk about the power of silence, so it’s not as if 
this was completely new territory. (Dolar 2006) My theories were different from what Dolar was 
describing, though. Dolar was speaking of the phenomenon of aural silence rather than 
ideological silence. In fact, most of the existing scholarly work on silence seemed to focus on the 
aural aspect rather than the ideological. 
It occurred to me that developing a way of theorizing the ideological voice in a way that 
was similar to theorizing the aural voice was the key. There are three ways to consider the aural 
voice. When considering the aural voice, you may consider the actual sound, the meaning of the 
sound, and the mechanisms that produce the sound. You can use a similar framework for the 
ideological voice. You can consider the action that someone takes, the ideological position that 
action represents, and the mechanism that enables that action. That is the additional step I have 
taken with my formulation of the ideological voice that was informed by my fieldwork. 
Moving on to copyright law, in reading many of the works I studied for this thesis, there 
was a general cynicism about copyright law and its usefulness to musicians. Indeed, there 
seemed to be quite a vocal outcry against copyright law as protecting record companies and not 
musicians, and not without good reason. In fact, Matt Stahl recently published a book on that 
very topic where he examined the power imbalance between record companies and musicians. 
(Stahl 2012) 
Copyright law was originally developed to promote creativity. Today, with protection 
often lasting over 100 years and rights generally being assigned to record companies so that the 
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creators aren’t being protected anyway, it is hard to consider how copyright law promotes 
creativity. Kembrew McLeod explores copyright in general and recognizes that record 
companies wield a powerful tool of suppression. He contends that, “when companies try to use 
intellectual-property law to censor speech they don’t like, they are abusing the reason why these 
exist in the first place.” (McLeod 2005, 8) McLeod takes a very extreme position, but not an 
inaccurate one. 
In light of this, it was important to explore the ways musicians do have control over their 
economic success. If it does not come from copyright royalties, where does it come from? And 
how can musicians control their financial success? I spent a great deal of time considering those 
questions and, as it turned out, those answers became the theme that would tie all of the separate 
parts of this thesis together. 
I began with the general idea that I would be studying the ways in which the law acted to 
protect identity. In the end, though, everything comes down to money or power and I realized it 
was these themes that would become central to my thesis. While identity does not, in and of 
itself, carry a tangible value, it is still highly valuable. In fact, it is the ability to cultivate this 
identity that is central to the only leverage that a musician really has over a major record 
company. They generally assign their copyrights to the company, so copyright law has no real 
functional value to musician. But fame provides musicians with artistic freedom, financial 
rewards, and leverage over record companies. These financial rewards come from advances from 
record companies, concert tours, merchandising, advertising, and numerous other sources. 
Record sales are merely a reflection of a musician’s fame and a representation of the acceptance 
of their identities. So, like it or not, record sales are largely driven by identity. If there is any 
doubt, just ask Milli Vanilli. 
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Perhaps this seems like a relatively insignificant thing, but when we consider the power 
that musicians have over their fans, it is easy to see why voice and identity studies are so 
important in music. Musicians are a cultural phenomenon and their identities, which are tied into 
and often manifested in their voice, are what shape that phenomenon. The more complete and 
nuanced our understanding of musicians, their identities and voice, how they are created, and 
how they influence public perception and cultural capital, the better able we are to incorporate 
this understanding into a broader conceptual framework to understand cultural forces and change 
in general. 
It is in this light that I will discuss how identity relates to the legal system, specifically 
copyright law, in a meaningful way to protect musicians. This is not only important because of 
the consequences of identity, but also because of the significance of the legal system to 
musicians and ethnomusicologists. In 1992, Anthony Seeger called for ethnomusicologists to 
engage in studies of the legal system “not because it represents yet one more example of 
ingenuity for complexification found in homo sapiens, but because the daily exercise of our 
profession takes place within contexts partly defined by it.” (Seeger 1992, 345). Seeger was 
primarily theorizing in the context of field recordings and the relationship between subject and 
object, but it also benefits us to have a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted ways in 
which the legal system interacts with music as a process, music as a product, and music as it 
relates to musicians and their identity.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As an attorney and an ethnomusicologist I have observed a dramatic difference in the way those 
two groups conceive of the legal system. Ethnomusicologists often consider the judiciary as a 
capitalist tool of oppression while legal practitioners recognize that this is not how the legal 
system actually functions. This is a topic worth exploring further, but I opted not to open that can 
of worms here in the interest of keeping my focus on my particular object. 
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How we define copyright impacts what it protects by simultaneously providing clarity 
and also imposing the boundaries that limit its protection. These limitations are a central focus of 
this thesis. By breaking free of labels and broadening our gaze to understand copyright within a 
bigger picture, we can begin to see how natural it is to conceive of copyright as a means of 
protecting identity. In their 2004 book about copyright, Simon Frith and Lee Marshall suggest 
that “it is particularly important to understand copyright in terms that are not simply derived 
from rights owners’ property claims but also consider the broader effects of copyright on 
creativity and the social circulation of ideas.” (Frith and Marshall 2004, 5) 
In this light, in the second chapter I will explore the factual and philosophical history and 
development of copyright law. I will trace this development beginning with the Statute of Anne 
in England in the late nineteenth century and follow it internationally and through America to 
highlight where its growth followed similar developmental paths in both arenas and where it has 
diverged. I will also discuss how both foreign and domestic copyright law is once again 
converging. This is a necessary first step to understanding the interests copyright law protects 
and those that it does not so that it becomes possible to better understand the way the law has 
expanded to protect new rights and has evolved to fill gaps in copyright protection. 
The third chapter explores the right of publicity, a judicially created creature of 
intellectual property law designed to protect intangible rights not contemplated by copyright law. 
I will demonstrate, through case law, how the right of publicity has evolved through three stages 
of development from initially protecting only visual images and representations of celebrities to 
ultimately protecting their identity and ideologies, as well. This is relevant because it also tracks 
how our conceptions of the law can change over time and it serves as a benchmark for how 
copyright law has been developing in the courts. I, therefore, draw parallels between copyright 
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and the right of publicity. This leads directly into my discussions of moral rights in the following 
chapter. 
In the fourth chapter, I will introduce the moral rights doctrine, a concept that serves as 
the cornerstone for my arguments that copyright law, in its various forms, can protect identity. 
The moral rights doctrine is a legislative creature that protects the use of an artist’s product 
(music or visual art, for example) from uses that conflict with the artist’s morals or ideology. 
This doctrine is relatively common in international copyright law and has been adopted by the 
Berne Convention, an organization providing a legal framework for international copyright 
protection and enforcement, but has not yet been applied to music in America. In this chapter, I 
will argue that the tide has begun rising toward providing this protection to music in America 
and that the legislative protection of music by the moral rights doctrine is not just a possibility, 
but an inevitability. 
In the fifth chapter, I will introduce the concepts of the positive and negative voices and 
how they interact to represent a musician’s identity. The positive voice consists of affirmative 
actions that represent a musician’s identity. The negative voice can be simply thought of as the 
practice of speaking without saying anything at all. Often, the things we do not say are as telling 
as the things we do say. The negative voice is a musician’s intentional use of that concept in 
order to establish an ideology. By way of example, Tom Waits has a long-standing disdain for 
musicians who align themselves with advertisers and products. He demonstrates this ideology 
not just through his words, but also through his lack of action in choosing not to endorse any 
products or have his name associated with any commercial ventures. This is something his fans 
have come to expect from him and it has become an important and intentional part of his 
reputation and credibility. Any deviation from this norm would have a profound impact on his 
 9	  
image and that credibility amongst his fans. By choosing not to speak in favor of any specific 
products, Tom Waits has spoken rather clearly on his opinion of those products and their 
commercialization. 
In the sixth chapter, I will summarize the conceptual framework I established in the first 
five chapters to draw all of these threads together and weave them into an argument that the fact 
that copyright and intellectual property law work together to protect both work product and 
identity, voice, and ideology is not just a development, but an evolutionary mandate. In this way, 
the legal system is protecting both creations of the creative mind and the identity of those who 
create them. I go further than just that, though, by also considering whether copyright law as it 
exists is effective at providing the protections it is intended to provide and whom it actually 
protects. In a sense, this chapter focuses a very critical eye upon copyright law as it currently 
exists in America, but also explore why it has developed the way it has and suggest that this 
developmental path was not just necessary, but also beneficial for the music industry and the 
promotion of creativity in general. I will also consider some of the problems that technology 
presents for modern copyright holders and the ways in which technology might inform the 
development of copyright law going forward. 
Musicians are making inroads at eroding the still substantial power of record companies. 
Radiohead is the most obvious example of a band that has chosen to avoid record companies 
entirely, but other smaller musicians are helping cultivate a DIY industry that enables musicians 
to retain rights in their music while, as always, utilizing their identities as a powerful economic 
driver. Filking2 would be just one example of a genre that benefits from this type of business 
model. This industry includes crowdsourcing-type companies that will handle marketing for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Folk music based upon a fandom such as Harry Potter or Firefly. 
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musicians for a fee while allowing musicians to retain control over their intellectual property 
rights. The more musicians who choose this route, the greater the collective power of these 
companies will be. It’s kind of like the print-on-demand self-publishing industry for writers. 
So what does all this mean in the long run? These ideas, my discursive theory of 
comparing the aural and ideological voice, and my positive/negative formulation of ideological 
voice are powerful analytical tools. Aside from that, an explicit statement of how identity 
functions as an economic tool and a marker of power for musicians with respect to record 
companies is useful.  Voice studies are a growing area in ethnomusicology and, as that area 
expands, we have come to better understand what a complicated word “voice” is. This thesis, 
then, uses a fine paintbrush to add some detail to an already expansive and complex canvas. 
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CHAPTER I 
EXPLORING IDENTITY AND THE SELF 
 
The logical starting point for my study is the foundational concept of identity itself. 
Identity has been theorized in many contexts and may mean very different things dependant upon 
that context. As it relates to this project, identity works together with voice, each informing the 
other, to create a product, of sorts. Thinking of identity as a product is helpful in theorizing it 
with respect to copyright law because current discourse on copyright generally focuses on 
protection of a product. This is not universal, of course. Academics have also focused on 
different formulations of rights in order to consider the ways in which the law can protect those 
rights. 
One example is the treatise Music & Cultural Rights, edited by Andrew Weintraub and 
Bell Yung. This book contains chapters written on numerous issues relating to cultural rights 
around the world, Weintraub defining the concept of “cultural rights” in his introduction as 
“proprietary and proprietary-related assertions based on cultural grounds,” (Weintraub 2009, 1) 
and concludes with a chapter addressing the need for a cross-cultural legal framework. Some 
examples of cultural rights would include representations of culture through music, how 
government policies affect those representations, and the moral and ethical implications of those 
policies. This aspect of law in music is a “consideration of what happens when ’culture’ takes on 
new and varied forms of materiality.” (Myers 2004, 6) While this is a significant concern, it does 
fall outside the scope of this study. It bears mentioning, though, because it serves to illustrate the 
ways in which the law is conceived of and theorized to protect issues outside of music as a 
product or process. 
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The Individual and the Collective: Defining Identity 
 
Identity is a difficult concept to define and theorize, but all the more so when applied to 
musicians. Musicians hold a unique place in society. Whether we choose to acknowledge it or 
not, musicians hold a tremendous amount of power over their fans and over shaping society in 
general.3 While this influence is most noticeable when we are talking about celebrity musicians, 
that is not to say that local or regional musicians do not hold sway over their fan base. As I 
learned from my informants, they have an active fan base and are aware of the esteem in which 
they are held. In a sense, their influence over their fans is more direct than that of celebrity 
musicians because they have a more active engagement with those fans. This power is 
inextricably tied to identity: the musician’s, the fans’, members of society at large, and, to be 
certain, the infinite number of combinations that exist between each of those factors. Fans feel a 
strong connection with the object of their interest and the musicians have a unique opportunity to 
capitalize upon that interest. This capitalization can be either artistic or economic, but is most 
often both. 
This begs the question, then, of why musicians hold such an elevated status in our 
society. Celebrities, in general, are idolized in our society, but musicians are held in even higher 
esteem… and disdain. Even outside of a musical context, it is not uncommon to hear someone 
who is wildly popular or respected in a certain social sphere to be referred to as a “rock star.” 
This moniker generally has a positive association, but real “rock stars” have their fair share of 
negative associations, too.  The holy trinity of unhealthy lifestyle is sex, drugs, and rock and roll 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Further research focusing on celebrities may be found in the journal Celebrity Studies. 
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and they are almost inextricably linked in popular culture. Musicians become a locus for 
negotiating power relations and identity politics, establishing collective identity, driving 
commercialism, and defining cultural groupings. It is this complex web that I would like to 
unravel a bit. 
The driving force behind this complex dynamic is not an easy one to identify and cannot 
be reduced to some neat and tidy binary or defined in a single sentence. There is the Western 
social elevation of musical talent that marks the musician as someone special and, in some 
respects, above non-musicians. (Blacking 1973) There is the powerful marketing arm of record 
companies, whose very profitability and existence capitalizes on and relies upon this elevation. 
There is the wealth and extravagant lifestyle that so many rock stars display, nay flaunt, to the 
public that separates the “haves” from the “have-nots” and the entitled from the envious. And 
there is the need to perpetuate this lifestyle and these perceptions in order to maintain the 
lifestyle and feed the addiction to money, fame, and power that many rock stars develop as a 
result of the intoxicating power of this dynamic. 
Of course, it would be cynical to simply focus on the power and corruption inherent in 
this construction of celebrity. There are also positive uses of this power and many musicians 
utilize their cultural cache in order to effectuate positive change and endeavor to improve the 
societies in which they exist. Bono from U2 and Sting immediately come to mind, but there are 
countless other examples, as well. In a sense, the entire American folk music movement of the 
1960s was an attempt to effectuate positive social change through music. These factors are 
equally involved in the shaping of, and informed by, identity and the use of voice. It is these 
concepts around which the universe of the phenomenon of the rock star revolves. 
 
 14	  
Individual Identity 
 
Thomas Turino states that individual identity “involves the partial selection of habits and 
attributes used to represent oneself to oneself and others and to others by oneself and by others.” 
(Turino 2008, 95) He further explains that “our bodies and the social environment operate in 
dialectical ways throughout a lifetime to shape habits of thought and practice.” (100) While 
musicians are certainly not the only factor operating within Turino’s “social environment” to 
influence identity, they are undeniably influential. A dialogue requires the exchange of 
information in both directions, though, and it is the society with which musicians interact that 
frames this dialogue and its reciprocal effects. This dialogue is also temporal. Psychologists 
Lauren Duncan and Abigail Stewart have contextualized this temporality when discussing 
collective identity. They explained that “some individuals feel a deep connection to their time 
and place in history… that they are products of large social events and processes and that events 
in their personal lives are understood best by reference to social forces and movements.” 
(Duncan and Stewart 2007, 143) I would add that music and, by extension, the musicians that 
music is associated with play a crucial role in that temporality. 
Identity is a much more troubling concept than Turino’s construction, as convoluted as it 
is, lets on. Even within that construction, which I am actually quite comfortable with, there are 
countless implied layers, subtleties, and nuances. There are several different types of identity that 
we can identify. For example, context plays a significant role in the perception of identity. 
People I interact with in a professional environment are likely to see a different facet of my 
identity than people I interact with socially. A significant other is privy to a side of me that 
nobody else is. Ron Scollon discusses the notion that there are multiple manifestations of identity 
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in his study of the Chinese concept of Face as the “difference between “miànzi and liân, between 
an "outer" or social face and an "inner" or personal character face.” (Scollon 1995, 14) There are, 
of course, more than just two such manifestations, but a nearly infinite number dependent upon 
context. We can consider these different contexts facets of a greater whole, but each no less 
important to identity construction than the others. This then begs the question of whether there is 
a true identity as opposed to perceived identity. If there were such a thing as a true identity, then 
it would have to be objective and verifiable. Even if there is such a thing, we must be cognizant 
of the fact that this objective identity most certainly differs from our own perceived identity of 
self, with the self being “a sense of who and what we are.” (Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan 1993, 
209) Self, then, is necessarily subjective and rarely a reflection of who and what we really are. 
Nobody is a more effective con artist of the self than the self. 
However, one of the reasons identity is difficult to conceptualize in terms of real and 
perceived is the fact that it is self-validating. We might perceive ourselves in a way that is 
counter to reality, but the very act of forming that perception incorporates it into our identity in 
some way, thereby making it real. In a sense, it is impossible to portray facets of identity that are 
not real because they become real the moment they are presented. In fact, the very act of forming 
a “false” identity is, in a sense, its own facet of individual identity. 
Identity, then, can be parsed out in multiple ways. There is true, objective identity (more 
of a concept than a reality) and there is perceived identity, which can then be divided into our 
own perceived identity, which is tied into our sense of self, and our identity as perceived by 
others, which can then be divided into multiple formations dependent upon context. In reality, 
the only true identity we have is the one that is comprised of all of those constructs, in their 
 16	  
infinite numbers, variations, complexities, and nuances, and how they interact with and inform 
each other. 
As it relates to my fieldwork, my informants had many different ideas about identity, 
each focusing on something different, yet all similar in some way. One common thread between 
them was that they all acknowledged that identity reflects a conscious decision of the musician 
and, as Sarah put it, “is the largest part of their act and is crucial to their success.” However, she 
also told me that, “I think my private life is well represented in my public work. I’ve always 
found it too much work to bother creating a persona on stage so I think both my musical and 
personal identities are very closely related.” (Interview, November 10, 2012) This suggests an 
organicism and realness of her public identity that grows out of her private identity. 
Tom told me that he has, “difficulty fabricating and marketing a specific brand or image 
so I rely on my body of work to create my public image.” (Interview, December 19, 2012) The 
connection he made between his identity and his work as almost being one in the same was 
interesting, but I think lacking in an important sense. The important question being how his work 
is reflective of his identity and why he made the choice of unifying his public identity with that 
reflected in his work in the first place. It is also worth asking whether it is possible for your work 
not to reflect your identity in some meaningful way. 
This type of sincerity was reflected by Ben, who noted that he thinks, “Identity is purely 
being as ‘real’ as you can be… I try to just be myself… people respond to sincerity.” He 
followed this statement up, though, with a general statement about his own public and private 
personas by telling me that he is, “a bit more reserved off stage. Not comfortable in social 
situations… I am much more outgoing on stage.” (Interview, December 17, 2012) This suggests 
an artificiality of identity, in a sense, despite his claim to sincerity. Artificiality was reflected 
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much more explicitly in my discussion with another informant who had a different approach to 
identity and noted the importance of focusing on good production value because, “real life is a 
lot messier and more uncertain for me.” This is a stark contrast to the first two informants 
because this explicitly acknowledges an intentional artificiality of individual public identity that 
implicitly marks a difference between the two. 
The thing that was common between all of my informants, though, was the fact that all 
were conscious of the existence of an identity as a musician and the fact that they had to consider 
and make decisions regarding the nature of that identity. Even where my informants chose to 
present an identity to their fans that was consonant with what they perceived as their non-public 
identities, there is still an artificiality about their public identities because of the fact that it was 
shaped and is the result of a conscious and considered decision. 
If individual identity is as boundless a concept as I have suggested in this formation, how 
can we possibly hope to study it in any meaningful way? In a sense, it is impossible. In another 
sense, though, we can endeavor to identify and acknowledge as many of these identities as 
possible and use them to inform our treatment of our research object. Each individual study then 
goes to inform discourse on that, and related, objects and helps shape perception of those objects. 
It is through the development of this complex discursive web that our understanding of the world 
around us becomes more nuanced and meaningful. 
 
Collective Identity 
 
To this point, I have just discussed individual identity, but there is another construction of 
identity that also creates strands within our complex conceptual web. Collective identity is a 
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social construct that “addresses the ‘we-ness' of a group, stressing the similarities or shared 
attributes around which group members coalesce.” (Cerulo 1997, 386) Collective identity, of 
course, is a very complex notion because it relies upon complex interactions within a collective. 
In collective identity, “identities emerge and movements ensue because collectives consciously 
coordinate action; group members consciously develop offenses and defenses, consciously 
insulate, differentiate, and mark, cooperate and compete, persuade and coerce.” (393) We might 
also add the word “unconsciously” to that definition because subconscious actions are also very 
real influences on collective identity. 
These collective identities can also be thought of as what Turino refers to as cultural or 
identity cohorts. “Cultural cohort or identity cohort [refers] to social groupings that form along 
the lines of specific constellations of shared habit based in similarities of parts of the self.” 
(Turino 2008, 111) Members of cultural cohorts are “constantly being identified by others 
because of attributes and deep-seated habits operating below their own focal awareness but 
clearly noticeable to others.” (102) As ethnomusicologist Katherine Meizel explains, “culture in 
the United States is created in the continuous negotiation and renegotiation of these identities – 
of personal, community, and national identities, informed by ideas about race and ethnicity, 
religion, place, gender, and what it means to be American.” (Meizel 2011b, 3) 
Because this type of identity relies upon social interaction, we might also think of it as 
social identity, or “the multifaceted labels by which (a collective member’s) Me is recognized by 
themselves and members of society.” (Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan 1993, 212) These collectives, 
or cohorts, then operate together to influence culture. As Meizel explains, “popular music is a 
key source of these identity markers, which help to shape understandings of Americanness.” 
(Meizel 2011b, 3) Musicians play a key role in this process because they are often the focal point 
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of cultural cohorts or, more accurately, elevated above the cultural cohort as a whole as if on a 
pedestal. These cohort leaders, if you will, are then in a unique position to shape social identity, 
which then trickles down to affect individual identity, which then informs perceived identity. A 
sort of trickle-down economics of identity. 
This entire discussion revolves around the idea of identity politics. Identity politics is not 
an easy concept to define, but one formulation of it is “the activism engaged in by status-based 
social movements.” (Bernstein 2005, 48) Stated more succinctly, identity politics and, to be 
certain, identity in general, are nothing more than negotiations of power and influence. 
Musicians, in a sense, are a product that participates in this negotiation because they are a focal 
point of certain cultural cohorts that shape identity and “the salience or importance of an identity 
to people drives them to enact its behavior, using identity-associated products.” (Kleine, Kleine, 
and Kernan 1993, 210) These negotiations are ultimately effectuated through the use of voice. 
 
Theorizing the Voice in the Context of Identity 
 
On the surface, the voice is the product of the physical apparatuses that produce sound 
and shape that sound into a representation of thought. The thing that separates this idea of voice 
from mere sound is the conveyance of meaning. However, sounds that would not be 
contemplated by this formation of voice do carry meaning. A cough or sneeze, for example, 
might carry the meaning of illness or allergy. However, it is important to have some method by 
which to separate physical sound from voice or one term swallows up the other and there is no 
need for either. 
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Traditional voice studies generally theorize voice in its relation to speech, but “a 
comprehensive vision (of voice) demands a concept that transcends individual fields of study, 
and encompasses the dizzying array of aesthetic, philosophical, linguistic, acoustic, cognitive, 
and sociopolitical factors that impact how we produce and hear voices.” (Meizel 2011a, 1) This 
sentiment is echoed by Cavarero when she states that “the original aspect of vocality, as a new 
object of study, therefore concerns an analysis of voice that avoids the traditional privileging of 
its relationship with language.” (Cavarero 2005, 12) Under this fairly new approach to voice and 
vocality, there is more to a voice than simply a sonic phenomenon. Simon Frith stated that “the 
voice… is as important for the way we listen as for the way we interpret what we hear.” (Frith 
1996, 192) I take that to mean that the voice is not only what is said, but also what is 
communicated. Adriana Cavarero confirms this when she explains that “before making itself 
speech, the voice is an invocation that is addressed to the other.” (Cavarero 2005, 169). 
Roland Barthes’ famous definition of the “grain” of the voice is that “the ‘grain’ is the 
body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it performs.” (Barthes 1977, 188) 
This formulation seems to allow for the non-verbal voice, but can it also be applied to an idea? 
He goes further to state that our culture “wants art, wants music, provided they be clear, that they 
‘translate’ an emotion and represent a signified.” (185) People search for the meaning in things 
that they consume, so while they are hearing the sonic sensation of a physical voice, what they 
are searching for is a hermeneutic meaning behind those sounds. I believe that the underlying 
search for meaning permits the voice, and consequently the grain of the voice, to refer to identity 
in addition to sound. This, then, would be our ideological voice, or the aspect of voice that 
reflects our identity, in all of its complexities. 
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Voice also becomes a marker for sincerity and credibility. Frith notes that “we use the 
voice, that is, not just to assess a person, but also, even more systematically, to assess that 
person’s sincerity: the voice and how it is used (as well as words and how they are used) become 
a measure of someone’s truthfulness.” (Frith 1996, 197) Voice, then, is a key marker in the 
construction of individual and collective identity, as well as a key component of the commercial, 
commodified product that musicians create as a facet of their identities. Communication scholars 
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, in considering the use of voice in deaf culture, posited that 
“voice can usefully be thought of as a technology: it is not merely a biological quality or a 
medium of expression, but an entity to be cultivated, managed, and most recently, converted into 
a commercial commodity.” (Padden and Humphries 2006, 101) 
Of course, viewing voice as a technology dehumanizes the voice.  Composer Miriama 
Young addressed this phenomenon when she discussed “the separation of the voice from the 
body from which it originally emanated – the emergence of the disembodied voice.” (Young 
2006, 83) She discussed the disembodied, or acousmatic, voice in reference to the development 
of recording technology. The phonograph allowed people to hear the voice without seeing the 
body, a phenomenon we are now completely accustomed to, but which was probably quite 
shocking at its inception. As a result of phonographic recording equipment, “the voice became 
free-floating, no longer rooted in a particular body, or to a specific locale.” (83-84) Another form 
of the disembodied voice is found on the printed page and reflected in what we think of as the 
“writer’s voice.” Writer Alvarez describes that as “the vehicle by which a writer expresses his 
aliveness.” (Alvarez 2004, 23) This type of formulation of voice becomes very important in 
identity studies because it allows us the conceptual freedom to apply the concept of voice to 
more than just the sonic phenomenon. As a result, voice is, in fact, one of the most powerful 
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influences on negotiations of power, identity politics, creating cultural or identity cohorts, and 
shaping individual and collective identity. 
When I interviewed my informants, I wanted to get a sense of what they thought of when 
I mentioned the term “voice.” I think that I expected all of them, as vocalists, to focus on the 
physical production of sound, but I was somewhat surprised by their answers. They ran the 
gamut from covering both the physical and ideological voice by acknowledging that voice, 
“could literally mean the sound I produce with my mouth when I speak or sing, or it could mean 
the character behind that sound: the soul, the phrasing, the humor, or the emotion” to voice being 
a reflection of musical style as “the lyrical and/or musical style that a certain artist has 
developed” to the explicit acknowledgement of this ideological voice where voice can be, “your 
personal opinion concerning something.” The thing that each of these statements about voice had 
in common is that each of them contemplated something other than merely the physical 
production of sound. I couldn’t help but wonder, though, whether those responses were 
preexisting ideas or whether knowing that they were being interviewed for an academic paper 
caused my informants to think about this idea in a way that they never had before. One thing that 
was consistent amongst each of my informants is that they all associated voice with identity or 
ideology. 
More than just a single concept susceptible to simple definition, identity ends up being a 
very complex web of different concepts, theories, actions, beliefs, and perceptions that define the 
different ways we see ourselves and the different ways others perceive us. Individual and 
collective identity both operate in a dialectical manner through voice to inform each other and 
influence their growth in ways that can be harnessed and used for pecuniary gain. This is the 
phenomenon that record companies rely upon to drive record sales and provide them with their 
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profits and power over musicians. It is also the phenomenon that the musician can turn to his 
financial advantage in order to use certain aspects of his identity to perpetuate the mystique of 
his perceived identity and enjoy the power, money, and fame that comes with the elevated social 
position of the “rock star” and the influence they have on their cultural cohorts and society at 
large. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
 
Having explored the complexities of identity and the interactions between identity and 
the voice, I turn my attention from the conceptual to the more concrete and consider the 
development of copyright law. This discussion is more one of history than theory, but it is 
important to understand where copyright law comes from and how it has developed in order to 
understand both where it currently stands and what it truly protects and to consider the ways in 
which it might develop in the future. As musicians become foci of cultural collectives, the 
musician and the collective become mutually dependent in an almost dysfunctional way, each 
informing and relying upon the other. Creatures of their own making, musicians often find their 
identity is a more valuable commodity than their music. Identity then, as with any product or 
commodity, can be exploited, attacked, and damaged, both from outside and within.  As the 
commercial product of the musician’s music is informed by the musician’s identity, identity 
becomes as important as the physical work product. As such, what role does the law have in 
protecting a musician’s interest in his identity and how has the law responded to the need for 
such protections? 
I begin, though, with a question. What do you think of when someone mentions the word 
“copyright?” 
Chances are pretty good that you think of either piracy or copyright infringement,4 and 
with good reason. Those are the two most prevalent concerns in copyright law, both for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 By copyright infringement, I mean one artist using another artist’s work product without 
compensation and claiming it as their own. 
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musicians and for the recording industry in general. Piracy, as a concept that deals with the 
relationship between a copyright holder and consumers, is a hotly contested issue, both from an 
economic standpoint as represented by the music industry’s efforts to curb the practice and from 
an academic perspective. Many scholars (and record industry executives) believe that “piracy is 
the greatest threat facing the music industry worldwide today.” (Chiou, Huang, and Lee 2005, 
161) Indeed, piracy might be a greater problem internationally than it is domestically. For 
example, as recently as 2008, the cassette culture in Indonesia was strongly influenced by piracy 
and “the actual ratio of legitimate cassettes sold to pirated copies sold was about 1:8.” (Wallach 
2008, 16) Many commentators see this culture as being destructive to creativity. 
This is not a universally held feeling, though. Some musicians are not so bothered by 
piracy because, “if one’s work is pirated, it indicates that one’s music has achieved a measure of 
mass acceptance.” (Wallach 2008, 88) Robert Easley suggests that the music industry’s response 
to piracy “may be holding back the evolution of the music industry towards an ultimately 
beneficial embrace of the possibilities inherent in electronic distribution of music.” (Easley 2005, 
163) The reasoning behind his contention is that these emerging technologies that enable 
pirating, which he refers to as “disruptive technologies,” represent opportunities. Much like 
companies such as Kodak that based their existence on technologies that have become outdated, 
the music industry runs the risk of being “left behind when the market moves en masse to a new 
technology.” Easley sees this as an opportunity, though, because “there is clear evidence of a 
willingness to pay for online music in general, via legal download services.“ (164) 
Emerging technologies provide an interesting lens through which to look at piracy, 
though. How does YouTube relate to copyright and piracy? Lucas Hilderbrandt cynically 
suggested that it didn’t until YouTube was purchased by Google and had enough influence and 
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money to make it worth suing (Hilderbrandt 2007) YouTube provides a method by which users 
may share videos around the world instantly, providing a forum both for the ready exchange of 
ideas and violations of copyright. Napster, of course, is one of the other high-profile examples of 
a technology that made it possible to similarly share media, providing a forum for new bands to 
distribute their music to a larger international audience, but also providing the means for 
consumers to download copyrighted music without paying for the right to do so. Raymond Shih 
Ray Ku described this interplay between digital technologies and copyright law as a “digital 
dilemma.” (Ku 2002, 263) While piracy and the relationship between rights holders and the 
consumer is one of the major aspects of copyright law, and a hotly contested one, the other major 
issue has to deal with the relationship between rights holders and subsequent authors. 
With respect to that relationship, “copyright is vital to the existence of the music industry 
because the industry is based upon ownership of… songs and recordings.” (Moser and Slay 
2012, 10) It can be logically argued that infringement on copyright, with respect to stealing the 
creative ideas of others and presenting them as your own, poses as great a threat to creative 
production as does piracy. This is why copyright protection is seen by many as vital to the 
protection of creativity and as an incentive for authors5 to continue to create. 
This proposition is not without its counter-arguments, though. David Moser and Cheryl 
Slay note that one argument against copyright law “is that since it is often large companies rather 
than authors who end up owning copyrighted works, copyright law does not really provide much 
incentive for authors to create.” (Moser and Slay 2012, 7) This is significant because “copyright 
exists to provide incentives for authors to produce works and thereby avoid the underproduction 
that might otherwise result.” (Wu 2004, 281). Because of the fact that large companies generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A term that includes musicians in the context of copyright law. 
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own exclusive rights, copyright law does not really protect the musician as much as it protects 
the record company. Matt Stahl addresses this when comparing the successful recording artist 
with lesser-known musicians who sign with major labels in acknowledging that musicians 
“typically work under unequal contracts and must hand over long-term control of the songs and 
albums they produce to their record companies.” (Stahl 2013, 2) He characterizes the 
employment relationship between musicians and record companies as “contractual bondage.” 
This was a common trope amongst my informants, who all communicated the experience 
of not seeing much economic benefit in producing recordings as most of the revenues, and profit, 
went to the record companies. They all seemed to feel that copyright protection was important to 
them as musicians, though, because of some abstract idea about how copyright protects their 
economic interests. When asking about the importance of copyright, Matt responded by telling 
me that, “I think the concept of paying someone for their art, to use their art, to borrow their art, 
to whatever, is a good concept. I think it needs to be that way.” (Interview, December 29, 2012) 
Sarah, the jazz vocalist who has recorded two albums but also written a couple of songs 
protected by copyright, told me, “I think copyright is important because it protects artists, but it 
mostly protects artists who are really well known.” (Interview, November 10, 2012) Sarah’s 
comments underscore the difference between celebrity musicians and work-a-day musicians. 
This difference exists not just financially, but in terms of artistic freedom as well. 
If I sound a bit cynical about the way my informants perceive the importance of 
copyright protection to their economic interests, it is because I am to a certain extent. This mild 
cynicism comes from the misconception that musicians actually make money off of their music. 
There are a number of potential revenue streams available to musicians and it is worth 
distinguishing them at this time to better understand which ones are, or should be, most 
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important to musicians. First, of course, there is copyright. Copyright provides for a payment to 
the rights holder any time someone wants to play, perform, or use a protected work. In most 
cases, for example with ASCAP or BMI, a radio station pays a lump sum to one company for the 
right to play any songs distributed by that company and the company distributes those revenues 
to the rights holder. Sometimes, though, as in the case of commercial endorsements, a single 
lump sum is paid to the rights holder directly for the right to use a song on a limited basis known 
as synch rights. This operates in conjunction with the second potential revenue stream for 
musicians, payment for producing recordings. This represents the lump sum (sometimes in 
conjunction with a share of proceeds from record sales) that a musician is paid to walk into the 
studio and make an album. This can be thought of as part of the payment for granting exclusive 
rights to the record company, but it can also be considered its own revenue stream and a rather 
significant one. 
Musicians can also earn revenue through concerts or gigging. A concert tour is separate 
from a record deal (although they can be lumped together) and payment for this might include a 
lump sum, a share of the gate (or ticket revenues), or a combination of the two. This also ties into 
non-musical revenue streams, such as t-shirts, other merchandising proceeds, and multimedia 
products and revenue streams (mobile phone apps, as an example).6 Musicians are aware of these 
different potential revenue streams, too. Sarah told me she believes that music consumers, “want 
an experience. I mean, we live in such a world where people don’t just listen to music much 
anymore. It’s this multi-sensory thing and people love to feel like everything is virtual, 
everything is like right there before you in this one single package.” (Interview, November 10, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 While it is not a primary focus of this thesis, Matt Stahl’s book Unfree Masters: Recording 
Artists and the Politics of Work provides a thorough examination into the relationship between 
musicians and record companies. 
 29	  
2012) Royalties from use, then, are only a small potential portion of the types of revenues 
available to musicians. The Future of Music Coalition prepared a report detailing revenue 
streams for musicians and identified 42 distinct revenue streams. These fall under the main 
categories of Songwriter and Composer Revenue, Performer and Recording Artist Revenue, 
Performer Session Musician Revenue, Knowledge of Craft: Teaching and Producing, Brand-
Related Revenue, Fan, Corporate and Foundation Funding, and Other Sources of Revenue. 
(Future 2014) 
Another argument against copyright law is that one of the things the law considers 
infringement is what some refer to as “transformative appropriation,” or “the act of referring to 
or quoting old works in order to create a new work.” This practice “historically functioned in a 
spirit of sharing, friendly competition, and homage” and was quite common prior to the 
application of copyright law to musical works. (Demers 2006, 4) Consider the works of Mozart, 
Beethoven, or any other Western art music composer who has ever written a Theme and 
Variations. Such compositions would not be permissible under current copyright law without 
first paying an often exorbitant amount of money to some record company for the right to make 
them. 
These competing arguments represent the issues present in the bulk of copyright 
scholarship, but the issue of copyright and identity has only briefly been touched upon. Thomas 
Turino stated “music is a key resource for realizing personal and collective identities which, in 
turn, are crucial for social, political, and economic participation.” (Turino 1999, 221) Music is so 
closely tied to our identity, both as a society and as individuals, that it is nearly impossible to 
separate the two. 
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From a legal perspective, intellectual property law (specifically, copyright law for music) 
is thought to protect a product: a musician’s music in this context. This formulation of 
materiality distinguishes “idea from concrete expression, with only the latter being subject to 
ownership rights as a form of property.” (Easley 2005, 5) Music, of course, is one of the objects 
of the legal mechanism protecting intellectual property, but how does that relate to identity? The 
“right of publicity,” a cause of action that is outside of the purview of copyright law but still 
closely related, serves as a marker for the development of copyright law. It has evolved through 
case law from protecting first a somewhat concrete object, the image of an artist, to protecting an 
artist’s very identity and ideology. The doctrine of moral rights has developed along similar 
lines. 
 
The History of Copyright Law 
 
Copyright has a long history, both in the United States and internationally. While 
international copyright law differs from American copyright law in many respects, there are still 
certain lessons that we can take from international copyright law and apply domestically. But 
before delving into the international arena (or the domestic, for that matter), it is important to 
understand from where the concept of copyright and intellectual property derives. Conceptually 
speaking, a copyright, as applied to music, “is a bundle of rights (and) unless the song owner 
gives permission (referred to as a ‘license’) or unless a law permits its use, no other person can 
record, sell, copy, or publicly perform the song.” (Stim 2009, 171) As property, a song is subject 
to any use or misuse that any other property is subject to, including theft. One might then say that 
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the prohibition against infringing on copyright began in the bible with the commandment that 
“Thou shalt not steal.” 
The development of copyright law experienced a brief lull in its development between 
the bible and the sixteenth century, though. It was at that time that “several factors combined to 
turn copyright into a legal issue” at this time. Those factors included “the emerging sense of 
individualism… a period of rapid economic expansion carried by a new class of international 
merchants… (and) the invention of technology enabling fast and efficient reproduction of ideas.” 
(Kretschmer and Kawohl 2004, 22) One might consider this a “perfect storm” of social and 
economic factors that not only enabled more widespread dissemination of ideas and creative 
products, but also the economic exploitation of those products. It was then necessary for the law 
to respond to these new exploitations and provide the protections that justice deemed most 
appropriate. 
The Statute of Anne was the first legislative enactment that vested property rights with 
authors, as opposed to publishers.7 It is interesting to note that the term “copyright” derives from 
the 1557 Licensing Act in England, “which recorded who owned the ‘copy-right’ (i.e. the right to 
print copies of the work).” Copyright, therefore, was the literal right to copy something 
exclusively for a set period of time. As for the Statute of Anne, it was passed on behalf of, and to 
benefit, the Stationers’ Company “to allow them to profit from publishing, but also to provide 
authors with incentives to create new works.” (Moser and Slay 2012, 15) The Statute of Anne 
extended publishing rights in existing books for 21 years while granting authors ownership rights 
in new works for 14 years. It is important to note that one of the original forces driving the 
creation of copyright law was the notion that it would promote creativity, not stifle it. It is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The primary publisher involved in the development of the licensing laws (the precursor to 
copyright law) and copyright law was the Stationers’ Company. 
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worth noting the relatively short duration of copyright protection. The reasoning behind that 
short period was that expiration of the copyright would permit later authors to create derivative 
works through transformative appropriation without fear of sanction, thereby promoting 
creativity and production. It was, therefore, as important to grant exclusive copy rights as it was 
to limit the duration of those rights. 
The implications of this reasoning, providing authors with incentives to create new 
works, have been at the crux of the rationale for establishing copyright law, and later for 
expanding its protections, since its inception. It is believed by many that copyright law 
encourages innovation and creation by protecting the financial interests of the author. In other 
words, a musician can enjoy the financial benefit of his creation for a prescribed period of time, 
so there is a financial incentive to create. Others would say that precluding people from 
expounding upon established ideas actually prevents innovation and creation by preventing 
access to raw material that could otherwise be transformed into new and original works. I 
intentionally use the term “original” here when referring to something clearly derivative because 
everything is derivative. Original creation has not existed since the creation of the universe and 
every “creation” is nothing more than the discovery of a new way to combine things that already 
exist. In fact, there is no way to be certain that even the creation of the universe was an original 
act. The Big Bang had to be an explosion of something and the idea for the heavens and earth by 
a supreme being surely also came from somewhere. 
The first American copyright statute was the Copyright Act of 1790, which was based 
largely on the Statute of Anne. The most significant development in American copyright law 
after enactment of the 1790 act occurred when “President Theodore Roosevelt called for a 
complete revision of the Copyright Act in order to bring it in line with technological advances 
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that had taken place.” After all, it was technological development that necessitated the creation 
of copyright law in the first place, so it was only sensible that copyright law evolve to 
incorporate developments in the technologies of production. This resulted in the Copyright Act 
of 1909, which extended protection beyond writings and into the realm of “works that are based 
upon the creative powers of the mind and are the fruits of intellectual labor.” (Moser and Slay 
2012, 18) Copyright protection under this act lasted for 28 years with an available renewal of 
equal length. This was the first statute that covered musical, as well as literary, publications. 
The latest significant overhaul to copyright law in the United States occurred with 
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. This eliminated the registration requirement, meaning that 
works were copyrighted when they were fixed in a tangible form, broadened the coverage of 
copyright, changed the duration of copyright to 70 years after the death of the author for new 
works and 28 years after the enactment of the law for existing works still under copyright 
protection with an available renewal for an additional 67 years, and codified the fair use doctrine, 
among other things. Fair use is a somewhat less than clear concept as the statute does not 
explicitly define it. Even “the legislative history to the Copyright Act stated that the fair use 
doctrine is ‘an equitable rule of reason’ and, as such, is not susceptible to any ‘generally 
applicable definition.’” (Moser and Slay 2012, 208) 
Since the 1976 Act, there have been several amendments to the act and new laws passed 
to account for developments in use and technology.8 In 1989, the United States also finally 
became a member of “that preeminent international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.” (Nimmer et al. 2005, 2) The Berne Convention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For example, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, the Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995, the No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998, among others. 
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does establish some rights, such as moral rights, but it exists primarily as a union of participating 
countries providing copyright protection and an enforcement framework to foreign works created 
in member countries. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, however, provides 
that the act does not expand or reduce any rights granted to authors by operation of law in 
America. The Berne Convention, therefore, does not change domestic copyright protection; it 
only provides reciprocal rights between member nations. 
The United States was a latecomer to the idea of international rights, though, as the Berne 
Convention was originally passed in 1886. One might wonder why the United States was so 
reluctant to respond to international developments in copyright law, but there is no simple 
answer. American jurisprudence is based upon European law, but has developed independently 
and European case law has little value in American courts. This self-imposed legal isolation is 
not unique to copyright law; copyright is just a victim of it. Christopher Sprigman suggests that 
another rationale for America’s late accession to the Berne Convention was “the Convention’s 
prohibition of formalities.” (Sprigman 2004, 540) An example of these “formalities” would 
include the registration requirement, but it should be noted that there was already no registration 
requirement in the 1976 Act, passed 12 years before America subscribed to the Berne 
Convention. By the time Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
American copyright law was already responding to external influence, including developments in 
international copyright law, and the writing was on the wall for a gradual change in American 
copyright law toward conformity with international copyright law, which brings us to today. 
Today, statutory copyright law in the form of the Copyright Act of 1976 is covered in 
Title 17 of the United States Code. The cornerstone of Title 17 is the section defining the scope 
of the statute, 17 USC 102. It states that “copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
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title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” This 
establishes two criteria for copyright protection to apply: that the work be original and that it be 
fixed. There is no registration requirement for copyright to attach. Chapter 1 of Title 17 also 
establishes a few limitations on exclusive rights, in other words it provides for some uses to 
which copyright does not apply or applies in a limited manner. Some of these include 
reproduction by libraries and archives (§108), transfers of recordings (§109), or certain 
performances or displays (§110), but the most significant exemptions from exclusive rights 
copyright protection is fair use (§107) 
The Fair Use Doctrine was originally a judicial creation but was incorporated into the 
statute in 1976 and amended twice since then (in 1990 and in 1992). The Fair Use Doctrine holds 
that any use of copyrighted material “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.” In determining whether a particular use is a fair use, the statute sets 
forth four criteria to consider: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the work, the 
amount used, and the effect on the potential market for the work. It is this third criterion that 
allows for the use of “samples” of limited duration in new musical works. It is left to the court to 
interpret fair use and its scope through judicial decisions.9 
Most of the criticism of copyright revolves around copyright ownership. Title 17 
establishes that copyright protection vests in the author or authors of the copyrighted work. In the 
case of works for hire, though, the person for whom the work was created is considered the 
owner. Exclusive rights may also be transferred, though, and that is the crux of the criticism. 
Under the traditional model of the recording industry, the large record companies possess a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For more on fair use and sampling, see Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola’s Creative 
License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling. 
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tremendous amount of power over musicians. The only way musicians can hope to enjoy 
financial success is to sign with a major label, a condition of which is to transfer exclusive rights 
to the record company. The record company then has the resources to market albums, ensure 
national radio airplay, and distribute albums to record stores. This disparity imparts great 
bargaining power upon the record company, making musicians “subject to the superior market 
power of the monopolistic league of buyers of their services and products.” (Stahl 2013, 231) 
Musicians then have limited or no rights in their own music, sometimes even forcing them to pay 
for the right to remake their own songs. 
The traditional model seems to be eroding as a result of technological developments and 
the ability of musicians to avail themselves of new grassroots distribution methods. The most 
successful band to eschew the traditional model is Radiohead, a European band that has been 
outspoken in its criticism of copyright law. They released their seventh album, Rainbows, as a 
digital download and allowed users to set their own price. Since then, Radiohead has been 
releasing their albums independently and has enjoyed great success. There are, of course, also 
many musicians who have parlayed viral success on websites such as YouTube into major record 
deals and significant financial success, the most obvious of which is Justin Bieber. 
Modern technology, however, has given rise to the DIY (Do It Yourself) movement, 
where musicians and bands are using home recording and editing equipment to create albums 
and utilizing alternative distribution methods, such as iTunes and YouTube, to distribute their 
albums and generate buzz about their music. This movement is also known as the Direct-to-Fan 
business model. Examples include major names such as Radiohead and Trent Reznor (who is 
now back with a major record label) and smaller niche genres such a filk. 
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Some of the resources available for DIY bands include social networking sites like 
Facebook and MySpace, band websites, blogs, fan involvement, email campaigns, digital 
distribution on iTunes or Amazon, and companies that assist with the DIY process, providing 
marketing services to these bands for a fee while letting the bands retain rights in the content. 
This movement does not exist exclusively in music, though. Print publishing is being challenged 
by digital versions of books and self-publishing services that will print books on demand and 
provide services to authors, such as distribution through Amazon and traditional brick-and-
mortar stores, as well as marketing solutions. All of these alternative business models provide 
higher margins for authors and musicians, making such models desirable. Still, as Trent Rezner’s 
example illustrates, major record labels provide the most expedient method for widespread 
distribution and recognition and remain the preferred model of distribution and marketing for 
most musicians. And, since musicians do not make the bulk of their money from copyright 
royalties, but rather from record sales, concert revenues, and other revenue streams, major record 
labels still wield tremendous power over musicians. 
Another criticism of copyright law relates to the duration of copyright. Currently, 
exclusive rights in a copyrighted work last for the life of the author (or last surviving author) plus 
70 years for works created after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Act). For earlier 
works with existing copyrights, the term of the copyright was fixed at 28 years and was eligible 
for a renewal for a further 67 years. This is a far cry from the Statute of Anne, which set 
exclusive rights in new works at a flat 14 years and existing works for 21 years. This expansion 
was the result of pressure by major copyright holders to expand those rights so they did not lose 
them. This not only limits the ability of authors to create derivative works, but also protects the 
substantial interests of major record companies, while not providing much benefit for original 
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authors. Some see this as a way to perpetuate a flawed system and discourage production of new 
original works. 
An alternative theory of the purposes of copyright law was suggested by Attorney 
Timothy Wu, who suggested that there were two focuses of copyright law: authorship and 
communication. The authorship regime is the one that we are most familiar with where the law is 
primarily focused on protecting the author (or exclusive rights owner) of the work. Under the 
communication regime, the focus is on the dissemination of ideas. Timothy Wu suggests that, 
since 1976, “new sections of the law regulating competition among disseminators have emerged 
as a response to a transformation in the nature of the challenge of incumbents.” (Wu 2004, 280) 
He explains that the communication theory of copyright law exists because of the existing 
conflict between authors, disseminators, and consumers. They are “in relationships made up of 
repeat interactions fraught with potential for conflict and abusive behavior.” This communication 
theory exists as a kind of “antitrust policy as between disseminators.” (286) 
Regardless of the effect of copyright law on creation, it exists as a powerful force in 
American law. In my fieldwork, I found a general sentiment that musicians felt that copyright 
protection was important, but could not express specific ways in which it actually protected 
them. Tom believes that, “if not for copyright protection, many artists would not be able to work 
and make a living for their families.” (Interview, December 19, 2012) Will believed that, “all 
artists should be treated fairly in the legal system. Especially as it pertains to ownership of 
music,” providing a justification for the importance of copyright law. (Interview, January 5, 
2013) As I have illustrated throughout this basic introduction to copyright law, though, the 
interests that are actually protected by the law are not necessarily those of the musician. I am not 
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suggesting that copyright law should be changed, I am merely pointing out some of the practical 
implications of copyright law in the creative environment. 
 
Copyright and Identity: Making the Connection 
 
I have previously argued that voice is an integral part of identity. This discussion of 
copyright law ultimately ties back into identity because the ideological voice represents the 
outward manifestation of our identity to the world. This cultural force is particularly significant 
where we are considering someone with enough cultural cache to affect social change, both 
positive and negative. That person then acts as a focal point for the creation of cultural or identity 
cohorts. Cultural cohorts are especially influential when they grow out of a perceived affinity 
with the perceived identity of a celebrity. Idolization of musicians often leads to changes in the 
behavior and beliefs of cohort members to conform to those behaviors perceived to be in 
consonance with the musician’s. 
This is demonstrated most effectively when we consider celebrity scandals and how fans 
often feel betrayed by them. There is probably no better example of this principle in action than 
the Milli Vanilli scandal and the feelings of betrayal that the group’s fans felt upon learning that 
the faces of the marketing of the group were not actually the people doing the singing. Of course, 
the music was the same music fans had grown to love, but they were outraged at the perceived 
betrayal perpetrated by the band and the record company. This was a clear demonstration of how 
identity is sometimes more important with respect to a musician than his music. 
This danger is very real when it relates to the musician’s own actions, but is equally 
significant when the musician’s identity is assailed by others. These assaults often serve as a 
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galvanizing force within the cohort creating something of a bunker mentality. Having said that, 
identity can be thought of as a tool that the musician can wield to affect positive or negative 
change. As I have argued earlier, it also serves as a tool that can provide the type of economic 
benefit to the musician that his music simply cannot. Protection of this economic interest is why 
it is important to musicians for the law to protect not only their work product, or their music, but 
also to protect their identity. 
It is remarkable the type of antagonism, or at least mistrust, that exists between musicians 
and record labels. All of my informants shared the opinion that copyright was really nothing 
more than a tool used to protect the record companies and held little real benefit for them. This 
tension was best reflected in my informant who was involved in the production side of music, as 
well as the creation side. When I approached him to explain my project and ask for his 
participation, his fear was almost palpable as he eyed me with distrust and insisted upon his 
absolute anonymity. It was clear to me that he was greatly concerned with how his career might 
suffer if any major record companies discovered he had said anything they might perceive as 
disparaging against them or the record industry. Despite my insistence that his identity would be 
protected, I sensed that he was censoring himself throughout our interview for fear of saying 
something that might come back to haunt him later. This fear and self-censorship has 
implications with respect to the veracity and usefulness of fieldwork in general, but most 
immediately served to illustrate the power record companies wield and the fear that power 
engenders. 
Copyright law has not developed in a manner that enables protection of the musician’s 
interest in his identity, though, and typical civil law does not help, either. Libel and slander really 
only apply where someone has explicitly made false statements, either verbally or in writing, 
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about someone. That certainly has implications relative to identity, but it does not protect against 
the most insidious attacks on identity. There are two legal concepts in domestic and international 
copyright law, though, that do and they are slowly being incorporated into American 
jurisprudence: the right of publicity and the moral rights doctrine.
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CHAPTER III 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO TODAY10 
 
Joseph Stamets wrote a law review article on the “right of publicity” in 1990 where he 
discussed the historical development of the right and, what he considers, the troubling way it was 
applied to a high-profile case involving Tom Waits. He rightly points out that the right of 
publicity arose out of the already well-established right of privacy tort and it has become fairly 
widely accepted as a hybrid of the common-law causes of action of right of privacy and 
misappropriation, but I disagree with his conclusions and outline what I consider the 
development of the right of publicity since its inception and its implication for identity studies 
today in this chapter. 
The right of publicity was necessary because the right of privacy did not really apply to 
celebrities. One of the main casebooks11 on copyright law explains that this is because they “do 
not seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ which (courts) sought to protect. Indeed, privacy is the one 
thing they do ‘not want, or need.’ Their concern is rather with publicity, which may be regarded 
as the reverse side of the coin of privacy.” (Nimmer et al. 2006, 1195) While there is no single 
statement of what the right of publicity covers, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
provides instruction. Restatements are books published by the American Law Institute intended 
to provide instruction to legal professionals, but they are not binding precedent. §46 of the 
Restatement states that “one who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The bulk of this chapter is extracted from an upcoming article to be published in Popular 
Music and Society (Klein forthcoming) and is used here by permission of the publisher. 
11 A casebook is the name for a textbook used in law school. 
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using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of 
trade is subject to liability.”  (Restatement 1993, 8) 
Throughout its existence, the right of publicity has developed in three phases. The first 
was as a shortcut around contract and intellectual property law. The second was as a type of 
unjust enrichment substitute. The final phase, which is where the cause of action stands today, 
incorporates both of those approaches while also recognizing that there is something more that 
the right of publicity is capable of protecting, and that is a musician’s identity. I begin this 
chapter by providing a brief summary of the first two phases of the right of publicity’s 
development before moving on to explore the final developmental phase: the one that has 
ethnomusicological implications and should be of prime importance to musicians. 
 
The First Phase of the Right of Publicity 
 
The first phase of right of publicity cases was relatively limited in scope and protected 
only tangible representations, such as visual likenesses or catch-phrases. One of the first cases to 
recognize the right of publicity was Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., a 1953 
case where a professional baseball player entered into an exclusive contract with a chewing gum 
company for that company to use his likeness to advertise its product. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 
later entered into a contract with that same baseball player to use his photograph to sell its 
chewing gum. Haelan Laboratories sued Topps as a third-party defendant for violation of its 
publicity interest in using the baseball player’s likeness. 
Haelan Laboratories is fairly limited in its general applicability, aside from the fact that 
it marks the official beginning of the jurisprudence of the right of publicity as separate from the 
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right of privacy. The Court held that the right of publicity exists “in addition to and independent 
of that right of privacy.” The Court’s rationale for recognizing the right of publicity was that 
“many prominent persons… would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances.” (Haelan 1953, 868) While this 
application is relatively limited in its scope, it has been expanded since that time. 
Shortly after Haelan Laboratories in 1960, Dean Prosser published a law review article 
explaining the right of publicity in relation to the right of privacy. He wrote that the right of 
privacy has four separate types, which include “(1) intrusion upon one's seclusion or solitude, (2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (3) publicity which places one in a false light, 
and (4) appropriation of one's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage.” (Prosser 1960, 
389) The right of publicity, then, was recognized as a subset of the right of privacy and 
encompassed the third and fourth of Prosser’s types of privacy. Prosser has become one of the 
most oft-cited secondary sources in right of publicity cases and forms the basis of right of 
publicity jurisprudence. 
A later case representative of the trend of first phase right of publicity cases is the 1983 
case of John W. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., a case where famous talk show 
host Johnny Carson sued a Michigan portable toilet company for using the phrase “Here’s 
Johnny,” a phrase that had long been associated with Mr. Carson, in its company name and 
advertisements. The right of publicity claim was brought in conjunction with a Lanham Act 
claim12 where plaintiff characterized the phrase as a trademark and, therefore, protected. The 
right of publicity in this first phase is almost always pled in conjunction with the Lanham Act 
and, where the right of publicity is found to be the appropriate cause of action, the Lanham Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Lanham Act (15 USC §1501, et seq.) deals with trademark protection. 
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claims are usually dismissed. This is typical of pleading in civil actions. Attorneys must 
generally plead all possible causes of action when they file or they may lose the right to bring 
them later. A civil complaint, then, becomes something of a game of throwing spaghetti at the 
wall and seeing what sticks. Plaintiffs often plead dozens of different counts and causes of action 
with the knowledge that only one or two of them may survive a motion for summary judgment (a 
type of motion to dismiss). 
The Court, as is typical in these types of cases, upheld the dismissal of the Lanham Act 
claim, but found a violation of the common law right of publicity. The Court held that “the right 
of publicity, as we have stated, is that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the 
commercial exploitation of his identity. If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there 
has been an invasion of his right whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is used.” (Carson 1983, 
835) As an interesting side note, the Court also acknowledged Carson’s claim that he was 
“embarrassed by and considers it odious to be associated with the appellee's product.” (834) This 
section of the court’s opinion is what is known as dicta, or extra content that does not constitute 
binding precedent, but can nonetheless be instructive to later courts. As dicta, that was not 
recognized as a part of Carson’s right to privacy, but it is the beginning of a line of reasoning that 
finds its culmination in the third phase of right of publicity cases. 
 
The Second Phase of the Right of Publicity 
 
By the 1980s, the right of publicity had entered its second phase of cases where the cause 
was generally looked upon as a type of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is an action 
between two parties who do not have a contract, but where one has benefitted from the actions, 
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and has not fairly compensated, the other. An example of unjust enrichment might be where a 
house painter mistakenly paints the wrong house while the homeowner watches and does not 
stop the painter. There is no contract between the two because the painter’s contract was actually 
with the neighbor, but one has enjoyed a benefit of the other’s services without paying for them. 
A recovery is still allowed, but since there is no actual contract between the parties, unjust 
enrichment is considered a quasi-contractual action. This is just a summary of unjust enrichment 
and there are more elements to the cause of action, but for now, a summary will suffice. 
When New York first recognized a non-statutory cause of action for right of publicity in 
1981,13 it defined the action as “the right of an individual to control the commercial value of his 
name and likeness and to prevent their unauthorized exploitation by others.” (Marx 1981, 487) 
This is an interesting definition because it limits recovery to situations where only the name or 
likeness of a celebrity has been misappropriated. The Marx case was primarily about whether a 
right of publicity claim was descendible, meaning whether it would pass on to the victim’s 
descendants after death, but it also addressed the reasoning behind the claim in the first place. 
The Court recognized that the Marx Brothers 
earned their livelihoods by exploiting the unique characters they created… (and) there 
can be no question of intent to capitalize on the commercial value of artificial 
personalities created for entertainment purposes. Every appearance, contract and 
advertisement involving the Marx Brothers signified a recognition by the performers of 
the commercial value of the unique characters they portrayed. (491) 
This marks one of the first times a court of law recognized that there is some tangible 
value to a persona. The Marx court, then, placed a value on that persona and recognized that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A case where the Estate of the Marx Brothers sued a company that produced a play where the 
performers simulated the unique styles of the Marx Brothers. 
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someone making unauthorized use of that persona was unjustly enriched by its actions. This was, 
therefore, a situation where one party enjoyed an economic benefit by exploiting something the 
plaintiffs had intentionally developed as a tool for commercial gain. Stamets dances around the 
significance of this nuance where he discusses the Marx case in relation to Elvis impersonators 
and distinguishes the two cases as treating “performance style as a kind of animate likeness… 
(while) a right of publicity in abstractable personality qualities – such as sneezing comically or 
dancing like Fred Astaire – has yet to surface to support advocates for a right of publicity in 
performance style.” (Stamets 2012, 352) 
This analysis misses the point that the Marx case protected something artificially created 
specifically for commercial gain, while situations like those involving Elvis impersonators 
involve impersonations of an individual’s general demeanor and not something intentionally 
crafted for a pecuniary purpose. In a sense, the court looked at the Marx personas as artificial 
commercial creations while viewing Elvis’s persona as something natural (although that 
distinction is arguable). Under current law, impersonators are protected under the First 
Amendment because the impersonation is performed as a sort of parody designed to entertain 
and the intent is not to deceive or mislead the audience into believing it is not an impersonation. 
Put another way, “the difference between a ‘parody’ and a ‘knock-off’ is the difference between 
fun and profit.” (White 1992, 1401) In other words, impersonators are intentionally and 
obviously performing as impersonators. 
While first phase cases were generally brought in tandem with Lanham Act claims, 
second phase cases were frequently pled in conjunction with misappropriation. This is not, in and 
of itself, significant with respect to what constitutes a cause of action for violation of the right of 
publicity, but it does suggest the growth that was occurring in the case law with respect to that 
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cause of action. Initially, the right of publicity was viewed as a tangible thing, akin to a 
trademark or other intellectual property. By the second phase, the courts had begun to think of a 
celebrity’s persona as a tangible thing in and of itself and something with value that could be 
stolen or misappropriated. 
 
The Third Phase of the Right of Publicity 
 
The third phase of the right of publicity began with Midler v. Ford Motor Company in 
1988 and represents an expansion of the right of publicity that finally begins to shed some light 
on what exactly the right of publicity should be protecting. It is in this phase that 
ethnomusicological understandings of voice and identity come into play. While some cases are 
still decided with reasoning that is consistent with the first two phases,14 courts seem to be more 
concerned with exploitation of intangibles such as personality, identity, voice, or ideology than 
simply photographs or likenesses. 
In Midler, Ford Motor Company through its ad agency, Young & Rubicam, approached 
Bette Midler with the intent to retain her to sing for its commercials. After the briefest of 
discussions, Ms. Midler refused to agree to sing for those commercials, so Young & Rubicam 
retained a Bette Midler sound-alike to sing the well-known 1972 Midler song “Do You Want to 
Dance” for the commercials. Upon learning of the commercials, Midler sued both Ford and 
Young & Rubicam claiming a violation of her right of publicity.15 This is a unique case because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example, Jim Henson Productions, Inc. v. John T. Brady & Associates, Inc., 867 
F.Supp 175 (SD NY 1994) where the court applied an unjust enrichment reasoning. 
15 It should be noted that, where an advertising agency is responsible for producing the 
advertisement, both the agency and the company it is representing are liable under theories of 
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it is the first case that only addresses the right of publicity, rather than being linked with another 
cause of action. 
The Court ruled in Ms. Midler’s favor, holding that “a voice is more distinctive and more 
personal than the automobile accoutrements protected (previously). A voice is as distinctive and 
personal as a face. The human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested.”16 
(Midler 1988, 463) This is significant because it marks the first time a court made such a strong 
connection between voice and identity and the first time they were considered as justification for 
legal action. Philip Auslander characterizes this case as “an explicit effort to protect performance 
in ways not possible under federal copyright.” (Auslander 1999, 161) While he is correct that 
federal copyright protection does not protect the interests at issue in the Midler case, it is not 
really Ms. Midler’s performance in the traditional sense that the court was protecting. In the 
sense that identity is, in itself, a type of performance manifested through voice, though, 
Auslander’s position is correct. 
Voice and identity is a connection that ethnomusicologists are well aware of. Simon 
Frith, for example, has noted that “the voice, in short, may or may not be the key to someone’s 
identity, but it is certainly the key to the ways in which we change identities.” (Frith 1996, 197) 
The Midler court was very progressive, even quoting Don Ihde’s seminal work on voice, 
Listening and Voice, in its opinion. The use of that book marked the first time an opinion in a 
right of publicity case looked further afield than simply other case law, restatements of law, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
agency law. Of the cases discussed in this article, this is the first where an advertising agency has 
been implicated. 
16 The “automobile accoutrements” noted by the court refers to an earlier case where the likeness 
of a famous race car driver’s car was used in an advertisement and features of the car, 
specifically its white pinpointing, an oval medallion, and its color, were not changed, potentially 
leading people to believe the driver had endorsed the product. 
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legal publications to arrive at a deeper understanding of why the cause of action exists and what 
it ought to protect. 
Midler is also interesting because it is factually similar to an earlier case involving Nancy 
Sinatra, (Sinatra 1970) which had a different result than Midler. In Sinatra, Goodyear used 
Sinatra’s famous song “These Boots are Made for Walking” in advertisements for its “wide 
boots” tire design. The advertising company secured the rights to use the song, but chose a 
Nancy Sinatra sound-alike after unsuccessfully attempting to sign Sinatra herself. Factually, this 
sounds almost identical to Midler, also a Ninth Circuit case, yet the Sinatra court found no 
liability on Sinatra’s right of publicity claim. 
The main difference and, it turns out, the dispositive difference between the two cases, 
was that a third party owned the rights to the song in Sinatra and had duly licensed those rights 
to Goodyear and that Sinatra was only objecting to the use of a similar arrangement of the song 
and not the fact that the singer sounded like her. Sinatra claimed “that said song and the 
arrangement used by defendants ‘has acquired a secondary meaning’ [that was appropriated and 
designed to] deceive the public.” (Sinatra 1970, 712) That was not enough to impose liability on 
Goodyear because of the fact that Goodyear had rightfully obtained the rights to the song and a 
finding of liability would have violated copyright protection. The copyright holder had absolute 
control over the song and, in fact, the court pointed out that Sinatra herself “was required to 
obtain permission from the copyright owner to sing ‘Boots,’ and to make an arrangement of the 
song to suit her own tastes and talents.” (716) 
The Midler court noted that, “if Midler were claiming a secondary meaning to ‘Do You 
Want To Dance’ or seeking to prevent defendants from using that song, she would fail like 
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Sinatra.” (Midler 1988,  462) On paper, that is why Midler succeeded where Sinatra failed.17 
That conclusion is troubling, though, because Young & Rubicam also owned the rights to 
perform the song, so there is really little difference, if any, between Sinatra and Midler. So what 
accounts for the apparently conflicting decisions? In reality, this is likely a situation where the 
Court recognized that case law was not developing in a manner consistent with protecting 
everything the right of publicity should be protecting. Richard McEwen, in comparing both the 
Midler and the Sinatra cases, concluded that “the Midler result is more satisfying than Sinatra 
because it acknowledges the value of performance and provides a mechanism for performers to 
maintain legal control over its appropriation.” (McEwen 1994, 128) This is consistent with the 
underlying aims of the legal process in general. 
One of the most influential statements on the underlying aims of the legal process came 
from Harvard Law School professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. They claimed that, “in the 
satisfaction of all their wants, people are continuously and inescapably dependent upon one 
another.” (Hart and Sacks 1994, 1) Therefore, the three main objectives of any institutional 
system are “to avoid the disintegration of social order,… to maximize the total satisfactions of 
valid human wants, [and] the pragmatic necessity of a currently fair division.” (104) These 
objectives are actually closely related in that ensuring a currently fair division maximizes the 
total satisfactions of valid human wants, which prevents the disintegration of social order.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Like in Sinatra, Young & Rubicam had acquired the right to use the song, just not the artist’s 
voice. 
18 Having been both an attorney and an ethnomusicologist, I have observed a significant 
difference between the ways the two camps view the legal system. Ethnomusicologists often 
view the legal system as a tool of capitalist power and domination while attorneys see it as a tool 
to promote justice and equity. While this is, indeed, a fertile field for discussion, it falls 
somewhat outside the scope of this study and will not be addressed here. 
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All of these objectives are tied up in the generally understood notions of justice and 
equity that most people associate with the legal system and Midler satisfies each of them. If the 
system failed to protect Midler’s voice, it would threaten the three objectives by making it more 
appealing for others in a similar situation as Ford Motor Company to exploit the voices and 
identities of other celebrities in the future. This also demonstrates why the First Amendment 
does not afford the defendants protection in these instances. The First Amendment does not 
provide immunity where the use is merely exploitative. (Midler 1988) I believe it can also be 
implied that the First Amendment does not apply where the purpose is to mislead, confuse, or 
defraud the public, as in the Midler case. These considerations justify the “expansion” of the case 
law Stamets observed beginning with the Midler case. 
This expansion brings us to the most significant case in all of right of publicity 
jurisprudence: the 1992 Waits case. Tom Waits had a long-standing and public disdain for 
advertising, feeling that artists detract from their artistic integrity by doing commercials. In fact, 
his distaste for the practice was so strong he wrote a song criticizing the practice called “Step 
Right Up.” Frito-Lay’s advertising agency, Tracy-Locke, Inc., apparently missing the memo that 
the song was an indictment upon the advertising industry, wanted to hire Waits to sing a song 
that ironically mimicked “Step Right Up” for one of its commercials. Waits, naturally, refused 
and Tracy-Locke then hired a sound-alike to sing the song. What makes matters worse is that the 
advertising agency was “concerned about the legal implications of (the singer’s) skill in imitating 
Waits [and felt] that Waits would be unhappy with the commercial because of his publicly 
avowed policy against doing commercial endorsements and his disapproval of artists who did.” 
(Waits 1992, 1098) In other words, the advertising agency knew what they were doing was 
wrong, suspected it might expose them to liability, but did it anyway. 
 53	  
The court noted that “Waits’ voice misappropriation claim is one for invasion of a 
personal property right: his right of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in his 
voice.” (Waits 1992, 1100) Where the Waits case differs from its predecessors is that Waits 
sought not only economic damages, but also damages for mental distress. The court ruled that 
such damages were appropriate based upon the “evidence of Waits’ shock, anger, and 
embarrassment… because of his outspoken public stance against doing commercial 
endorsements [which] humiliated Waits by making him an apparent hypocrite.” (1103) This 
opposition is the crux of the rationale behind the Waits case and the genesis of what I call an 
artist’s negative voice.19 
As for the musicians I interviewed, they all acknowledged some sense of moral 
responsibility when dealing with endorsement. As I mentioned in my introduction, several of my 
informants have had their music used in some commercial setting. This has been from local and 
national advertising campaigns such as Chevrolet, the Detroit Zoo, Sparrow Hospitals in 
Lansing, Michigan, a Detroit television station, and various political campaigns, to use in 
television shows in both ABC’s Men in Trees and as the theme of the Showtime series 
Shameless, and one even had one of his songs used in an eCard. None of these musicians have 
the distinctive voice and fame of Tom Waits, but one of them related to me that a fan had his 
lyrics tattooed on her body, which also speaks to the type of relationship that can exist between a 
cultural cohort and its leader as it is reflected in how the musician/fan dynamic is manifested. 
As I mentioned, each of my informants noted some degree of moral or ethical 
responsibility when deciding whether to permit their music to be used in advertisements. 
Whether this related to their integrity amongst their fans or was just a personal decision, it is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Since the time of this case, Waits has successfully sued other advertisers on similar grounds, 
including Audi and General Motors’ Opel division. 
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reflection on their identity and is at least implicitly related to their integrity and reputation. The 
most opportunistic of my informants told me that, “as long as you don’t have any strong 
objections to the product or the way your music is used, I consider it a totally acceptable way to 
generate income and buzz as a musician.” After being pressed further, though, he acknowledged 
that, “there are probably some companies or products I would turn down even for good pay. 
Everyone should show some integrity now and then.” Other informants noted the importance of 
supporting the product they were being associated with. One told me that he, “would need to be 
familiar with a product, or have some affinity for it, before I could endorse it.” Another told me 
that he, “would think that one has to truly support what they are endorsing.” The interesting thing 
to me about these responses is that my question was not about endorsing a product, but rather 
about having their music used in commercials. They made the connection between use and 
endorsement, suggesting that they think of themselves as endorsing products when their music is 
used in advertising it. 
So what would my informants do if placed in Waits’ or Midler’s shoes and an 
impersonator was used in an advertisement in a way that led the public to believe it was them 
singing? I laid out the Midler scenario as a hypothetical to each of them and asked them what 
they would do in such a situation. One gave me a rather political answer and told me that he 
would be, “flattered that someone would want to imitate me, but I feel that there should be some 
sort of acknowledgement, financial or otherwise.” Another was more direct when he said that if 
he, “had written the song and relied on its success for (his) livelihood, and the person was 
intentionally trying to impersonate (him) for financial gain, then (he) would likely investigate 
what legal recourse (he) could take.” It turns out that he likely would have some legal recourse 
available to him. 
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Since the time of Stamets’ article, Minnesota has upheld the right of publicity stating that 
it existed to protect an individual’s identity. (Feagre & Benson 2005) A Missouri court held that 
the right of publicity protects “a person from losing the benefit of their work in creating a 
publicly recognizable persona.” (Bear Foot 1998) New Jersey, in an action by the Estate of Louis 
Prima against the Olive Garden restaurants for hiring a sound-alike to record the song “Oh 
Marie” for use in its commercials, affirmed the Estate’s argument in favor of an “enforceable 
right in Prima’s identity and persona.” (Prima 2000, 350) These cases, even though not dealing 
with negative voice, are still speaking in terms of things like identity or persona, which is the 
primary difference between third phase right of publicity and its earlier manifestations. Richard 
McEwen believes that Waits represents a “logical step in the evolution of intellectual property 
law,” although his analysis focuses mainly on the aspects of the case relating to the Lanham Act. 
(McEwen 1994, 139) Where Stamets sees this as an unjustified expansion of the right of 
publicity, I see it as a continuation of the natural evolution of the right of publicity. An evolution 
that provides greater protection to musicians and their identities and potentially tracks with the 
development of copyright law to include the moral rights doctrine. 
 56	  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
MORAL RIGHTS AND THE ETHICS OF COPYRIGHT 
 
The judicial doctrine of the right of publicity is one that I argue has expanded to 
encompass the protection of a musician’s ideological voice even where he does not possess 
exclusive rights in a copyrighted work, but this issue is far from settled. Even where it has been 
adopted, the boundaries of that right are not exactly clear and unambiguous. In order for that to 
happen, the right of publicity would have to make its way into statutory law in much the way the 
Fair Use Doctrine was codified. Even then, there would likely still be much room for 
interpretation, but at least it would be a legislative creature instead of a judicial one and would 
provide universal protection for a musician’s ideological interests in addition to his economic 
interests. 
American copyright law is actually somewhat unique in that it does not already provide 
for such statutory protection. The moral rights doctrine is such a statute and it exists in the Berne 
Convention and in the law of many of its member countries. Timothy Wu explains that, under 
what is known as the natural rights theory of copyright law, “authors have a moral right to the 
fruits of their labors,” (Wu 2004, 282) In this chapter, I explore moral rights, the ways in which 
they protect musicians, and what role they play in American copyright law. 
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Moral Rights and Identity 
 
The doctrine of moral rights is one that is relatively unfamiliar to the realm of American 
copyright law. As it relates to music, the doctrine of moral rights assumes that “the author of a 
song is considered to have some ‘moral’ claim to what happens to the song.” (Stim 2003, 173) 
There are two aspects of moral rights: the right to attribution and the classic droit moral. It is the 
latter set of rights that I am going to focus on here. The moral rights doctrine has made some 
headway in the United States, though, beginning with the protection of visual art in California 
and New York.20 California and New York are typically at the forefront of developments in the 
law, with the rest of the country following close behind, so we can look to these developments as 
harbingers of things to come elsewhere. 
Basically, the moral rights doctrine presupposes that “an author is believed to be morally 
entitled to control and exploit the products of the author’s intellect.” (Moser and Slay 2012, 5) 
Later in this thesis, I argue in favor of the idea of an artist’s negative voice, or the ability to speak 
by the absence of speech. The negative voice is the right that any individual, especially a 
celebrity, has to refuse to align himself with something as a means of protest or disassociation. 
This is basically what the doctrine of moral rights protects for visual artists. This principle, 
though, is every bit as applicable to the use of music as it is to visual art. In point of fact, music 
has an arguably broader scope of influence amongst cultural cohorts and society in general. 
It is also worth pointing out how state law interacts with federal law where they both 
cover the same thing. The doctrine of preemption holds that federal law preempts state law 
where there is a conflict between the two. This is a simplistic description of the interplay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See California Civil Code, Section 987 (amended in 1982) and Title C, Articles 11-14, New 
York Arts & Cult. Aff. Law 
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between federal and state law, though. A conflict only exists where state law does not provide as 
much protection as federal law. In such cases, state law would not serve as a defense against an 
action based upon federal law. States are permitted, in most instances, to provide greater 
protections than federal law in many areas, but where they provide lesser protections, federal law 
still controls. By way of a purely hypothetical example, if the federal government were to 
establish a national emission standard for motor vehicles, a state would be permitted to mandate 
a stricter standard. That state would just not be permitted to implement a lower standard. 
Preemption becomes particularly tricky where there are other areas of federal law, state law, or 
the Constitution that come into play, but it generally provides that federal trumps state law where 
there is a real conflict between the two. 
The reason this is important is because moral rights is a case where state law in New 
York and California began providing greater protections than those provided by federal law to 
visual artists, so those laws were not preempted by federal law. The New York and California 
laws made their mark on the federal landscape and have led to limited adoption of moral rights 
on a federal level. 
Demands for similar protections on a national basis after the passage of the California 
and New York laws led to the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.21 This law does 
not apply to music or other copyright protected media, but only to visual arts such as panting, but 
the creators of these protected works are protected not only from unauthorized use of the work 
itself, but actions that tarnish or assail the ideology of the work. The thing that is most interesting 
about this doctrine is that it is actually a codified part of Title 17 copyright law, as opposed to a 
judicial creation. Moral rights for visual artists exist in 17 USC §106A, titled “Rights of certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Visual Artists Rights Act, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) 
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authors to attribution and integrity.” That section holds that “the author of a work of visual art… 
shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in 
the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.” This right lasts for the lifetime of the author (or last 
surviving author) of the work, vests exclusively in the authors regardless of whether that author 
retains copyright ownership or not, and may not be transferred to anyone else. This is a method 
by which authors may exert some control over the use of their creations even where they have 
assigned exclusive rights to that work to someone else. Christopher Sprigman notes that some of 
the other methods available to original authors in America to protect their moral interests in 
derivative materials include “state unfair competition, defamation, and privacy laws; and the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.” (Sprigman 2004, 563) 
Why is there a limitation on transferability, unlike exclusive rights, and why does it 
expire upon the artist’s death? After all, shouldn’t the author’s integrity matter even after his 
death? While the legislative history of the statute is not instructive in this respect, it is not 
difficult to make an educated guess as to the rationale. The right is non-transferable, naturally, 
because the artist is really the only person with an interest in his reputation. It is illogical to 
permit transfers of this right as it could then conceivably be used to protect moral rights that 
conflict with those of the author. As for the lifetime limitation, that is also not difficult to justify. 
The author is the only person who can provide evidence of his own morals and what runs afoul 
of them. Exclusive rights granted by copyright attach to a physical object (notes on paper or a 
recording), so it is easier to define what is protected and whether it has been used or not. Morals 
are not so easily bounded, so it is much more difficult to define whether a use conflicts with the 
author’s morals. This becomes purely speculative when the author is unavailable to provide 
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testimony regarding those morals. That is not to say there are not clear-cut cases, but the more 
incorporeal the right, the more difficult it is to prove in a court of law. This is a case where 
evidentiary considerations and the possibility for abuse likely played a key role in the shaping of 
this right. 
Consider the amount of money companies like Coca-Cola and Pepsi spend to produce 
extravagant commercials starring musicians like Britney Spears, Christina Aguilera, and CeeLo 
Green. Names such as Michael Jackson and, while not a musician, Cindy Crawford are icons in 
the world of successful advertising campaigns. In the third chapter, I mentioned a few lesser-
known examples of such musicians, celebrities, and uses when I discussed the development of 
the right of publicity, but it is worth restating that this is not only an issue in the cases of the 
largest marketing campaigns with the biggest stars. Lesser known artists or smaller advertising 
campaigns such as Demi Lovato’s music being used in commercials for Accuvue contact lenses 
and Ingrid Michaelson’s having been used in commercials for home insurance are equally 
affected. One of my informants wrote the theme song to a television series on the Showtime 
network and two others have had their music used in local and regional commercials for 
everything from hospitals to McDonald’s to the Detroit Zoo. This illustrates that there is not just 
a market for use of celebrities in association with advertising and marketing, but also for the use 
of local musicians. 
My informants were not uniform in their attitudes toward uses of their music. Matt took a 
more opportunistic approach and was primarily interested in distribution of his music in 
whatever form it took. He told me he is, “typically just glad if anyone is hearing, ripping, 
downloading, remixing my music.” (Interview, December 29, 2012) Ben explained that his main 
concern is, “that my work and I are treated with respect and fairness.” (Interview, December 17, 
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2012) Norah expressed more concern about how uses of her music would affect her reputation. 
She told me that, “if it was hurting my image in any way or hurting people’s perception of me, 
then I might not be so keen to that.” (Interview, January 5, 2013) While these few responses span 
from ambivalence to concern over reputation, they show that there are certainly musicians who 
care about how uses of their music inform their identity. It might be argued that my first 
informant’s attitude is primarily the result of his lack of experience with uses of his music that 
conflict with his morals or tarnish his identity. Either way, moral rights are every bit as much of 
a concern for musicians as they are for visual artists.  
Moral rights, however, do not exist, either judicially or statutorily, in America to protect 
music. As I discussed earlier, Congress and American courts are reluctant to follow the lead of 
European courts and have been slow to consider adopting moral rights, so how do I arrive at the 
conclusion that such expansion is inevitable in the United States? 
The first piece of evidence can be found in the evolution of the right of publicity. As I 
discussed earlier, the right of publicity has developed in three phases. In the first phase, the right 
of publicity attached when a celebrity’s name, likeness, or something that can be readily 
identified as associated with that particular celebrity is used without that celebrity’s 
authorization. In the second phase of right of publicity jurisprudence, the cause was essentially 
viewed as a form of unjust enrichment. During this phase, the cause of action was defined as “the 
right of an individual to control the commercial value of his name and likeness and to prevent 
their unauthorized exploitation by others.” (Marx 1981, 487) The third phase of the evolution of 
the right of publicity developed as courts became more concerned with exploitation of 
personality, identity, voice, or ideology. In other words, the right of publicity has evolved from 
being about a celebrity’s likeness to being about a celebrity’s personality, beliefs, and reputation. 
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Of course, it does not necessarily follow that copyright law will evolve in the same 
manner that right of publicity law has. There are some factors suggesting that this migration has 
already begun to occur, though. First is the fact that copyright law with respect to the visual arts 
has already expanded to include “moral rights.” Second is the fact that America has joined the 
Berne Convention, a body that already recognizes “moral rights” in its acceptance of European 
copyright law. Finally, that the courts have become more concerned with protecting identity, as 
evidenced by the development of right of publicity jurisprudence. As the understanding of the 
significance of identity and the field of identity studies becomes more important, so will the 
demand that the law protect the identity of not just visual artists, but musicians, authors, and 
anyone else currently protected under copyright law. 
Phillip McIntyre has made the argument that music is naturally correlated to identity in 
his discussion of music and authenticity. He notes “that a band’s ‘credibility’ also suffers once 
they enter what has been called ‘the mainstream.’”(McIntyre 2012, 161) This is certainly 
evidence of a link between the band’s music and their identity. Similarly, “Bob Dylan’s 
authenticity depended on ‘an assumption of the literary aesthetic code of the genius creator.’ 
Dylan, when he famously swapped one style for another, from folk to rock, was vehemently 
rejected by his former folk audience.” (169)22 He suggests that, “in the very late 1960s rock 
performers in particular started to construct their authenticity around naturalness and the 
rejection of particular performance codes too closely identified with their parent’s preferred 
performance styles.” (168) Along the same lines, Joanna Demers suggests that, with the 
Copyright Act of 1976, “the ink-and-paper composition is now viewed less as an expression and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Quoting Gamson, Joshua. 1994. Claims to Fame: Celebrity in Contemporary America. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
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more as an idea… sound recordings are treated as expressions or manifestations of a 
compositional idea.” (Demers 2006, 36) 
I would suspect that, if you asked most musicians, they would agree that their music is a 
reflection of their identity. Choice of genre becomes almost as important as the clothes that a 
band wears or the subjects it sings about. Genres, and therefore musical sounds, reflect a certain 
ideology. It is not a far jump to see that musicians and, more importantly record companies, will 
ultimately demand that copyright law protect identity as well as product. In fact, Demers notes 
that “America’s information and entertainment industries are entrenched in a fierce debate 
concerning the moral rights and economic incentive justifications for copyright.” (Demers 2006, 
13) So why do I think this change is inevitable? 
If it were only one factor mitigating in favor of identity protection through statutory 
copyright law, it might be dismissed as inconsequential. Two might be more difficult to similarly 
dismiss. Three, though, constitutes a trend. I consider this evolution an imperative not only 
because I believe musicians will find such protection valuable, but because the law has already 
begun its slow but inevitable journey in that direction. 
The fact of the matter is that copyright law has gradually been changing since 1989 to 
bring it more into conformity with international copyright law. These changes have come about 
because record companies (who are the real copyright holder in most cases) have demanded the 
greater protection that the Berne Convention affords them, but musicians have also raised their 
voices in the interest of protecting the one thing in the creative process that is still truly theirs: 
their identity. Recognition of moral rights is merely one more step along the way to that 
destination. 
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There can be no escaping the fact that copyright law is one of the most significant areas 
of the law to musicians and record companies. It is equally true that people typically think of 
piracy or copyright infringement when they think of copyright law. There is much more to it, 
though, and America is not too far behind the rest of the world in recognizing even more rights 
for musicians than simply protecting a collection of notes on a piece of paper. 
Copyright protection has a long history, beginning in Europe and finding its way to 
America as early as the eighteenth century. Originally dealing with print materials and dealing 
with the right to copy those printed materials, copyright has expanded to cover all media of 
creative production, from books to music to visual art. While America is not yet in conformity 
with international law in all aspects of copyright law, it is slowly shifting toward that end. The 
most notable example of an area of divergence between American and international copyright 
law is the doctrine of moral rights. 
Musicians have a rather large stage and can be very influential to their fans and followers. 
It is very simple for a musician to affect behavior and attitudes by presenting a certain image to 
the rest of the world. This image constitutes a portion of that musician’s identity, or, as Turino 
would describe it, the collection of habits and attributes that the musician presents to the world. 
Due to that influence and its importance, both economically and ideologically, musicians would 
find it important to be able to control anything that might impact the public’s perception and 
behavior with respect to that identity. 
Moral rights would do just that. And while the doctrine has not yet found its way into 
American law for musicians, it does exist for visual artists and it is a well-accepted precept of 
copyright law in Canada and Europe. New York and California were on the cutting edge of 
incorporating this doctrine into their law with respect to visual artists. The federal government 
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followed their lead in enacting legislation granting moral rights to visual artists on a national 
scale. The next logical step would be to extend that protection to anyone to whom copyright law 
currently applies. 
Regardless of whether it is a good idea or not, it is inevitable that this change will occur. 
The winds of change are already shifting in that direction by way of this expansion for visual 
artists and the growing recognition of the importance of identity to the courts in the form of the 
right of publicity. America is also slowly falling in line with international notions of copyright 
law in conformity with the Berne Convention, so change is already occurring. This change will 
ultimately affect copyright law by introducing the concept of moral rights into American law.
 66	  
 
CHAPTER V 
THEORIZING THE IDEOLOGICAL VOICE 
 
I have referred to the term “negative voice” several times throughout this thesis, but have 
not really explained what it is in much depth. Negative voice is a concept of my own creation 
that describes the use of voice without voice. In his discussion of Freud’s drives, Mladen Dolar 
discusses the possibility of one using his “silence as a lever of his position, thus turning the 
silence into an act.” (Dolar 2006, 158) This is the heart of the negative voice. We are faced with 
decisions every day and those decisions can often be essentialized and reduced to one of two 
choices: to do something or not to do something. While the use of binaries to describe distinct 
and specific concepts is problematic, there is a point at which they can be useful. Attention is 
generally focused on what we choose to do; yet little attention is paid to the road left untraveled. 
That road can be just as meaningful as the one we take. 
So what is the negative voice and where does it come from?  The negative voice is the 
ability to speak through the absence of speech. It is the right that any individual, and especially a 
celebrity, has to refuse to align himself with something as a means of protest or disassociation. 
The celebrity speaks volumes by not speaking at all, or by speaking in the negative. I start with 
the idea that actual speech or action is a positive act. I do not mean positive in the sense of it 
being a “good” thing, but more in the sense that action creates something: movement, products, 
capital, relationships, or anything else. In that sense, there is a net positive effect on production. 
By failing to act, then, we are creating a negative result. A use of voice is negative, then, when I 
have made my choice to not act expressly and specifically on ideological grounds. 
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The negative voice comes from the notion that your voice, in the ideological sense, is as 
much about what you do not say as it is about what you do say. Dolar discusses silence in the 
context of Ulysses’ attempts to resist the Sirens when he explains that “the Sirens have a weapon 
far more effective than their voice: their silence, that is, the voice at its purest.” (Dolar 2006, 
171) Your identity is wrapped up in your general belief structure, so part of that identity entails 
what you do believe in, but also what you do not believe in. A musician has the right to be 
opposed to certain practices, hold people to certain ethical standards, and espouse a way of 
thinking or a way of life. The Waits case puts this into stark perspective because Waits had 
previously and publicly specifically spoken out against musicians doing endorsements in general, 
but the negative voice can exist on a smaller scale. 
Bette Midler chose not to implicitly endorse Ford by choosing not to sing for their 
commercial. Perhaps it was because Ford did not offer her enough money, perhaps it was 
because she did not want to be associated with Ford, perhaps it was something else. Whatever 
her reasoning for rejecting Ford’s offers, she exercised her negative voice by refusing their offer 
of affiliation. Perhaps, in light of these developments in the case law, Sinatra would be decided 
differently today. I believe that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, it would be. As a reflection of the 
musician’s voice, his negative voice is equally as important as his physical voice. 
 
Positive or Negative? How Do We Know? 
 
At this point, it is important to go into a little more detail about the two types of voices I 
have mentioned in this chapter: positive and negative. To the best of my knowledge, voice has 
not been theorized in this manner before, so this is fairly uncharted territory. As a result, I focus 
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primarily on my own ideas along with the results of my fieldwork in order to construct a method 
of theorizing ideological voice that can be instructive for voice studies in general. 
 
When Do We Use Our Ideological Voice? 
 
In a sense, we use our ideological voice every minute of every day. Broadly conceived, 
every decision we make reflects our ideas, beliefs, and ethics. Such a broad conception is 
essentially useless because it obviates the need to even consider the ideological voice.  A concept 
must not only include, but also exclude, or it loses its meaning. I recall discussions with other 
music scholars in my own life about how to define music. As Bach and Beethoven gave way to 
Schonberg and Berg, then to John Cage, we expanded our conception of what music is. But 
should our definition include sounds occurring in nature? How about the sounds of the hermit 
thrush, which have definite and complex musical qualities? Or the mating call of a wolf? Even 
whale songs or dolphins chattering have a communicative quality to them and certainly an 
intentionality that could be thought of as musical. But then, extending our conception, we can 
think about the sound of wind blowing against wind chimes or the rain on a tin roof. At what 
point does music stop and mere sound begin? If there is no point of demarcation, then it becomes 
useless to even have “music” as a term because everything is music. 
I do not bring this up to propose a definition of music, but rather to illustrate a point 
about the dangers of overly broad conceptions of terminology. It is, therefore, necessary to place 
limits around the idea of ideological voice so that we can more meaningfully consider the ideas 
of positive and negative voice. While it is true that we are almost constantly using our 
ideological voices in some sense, such a broad conception of the term swallows itself and 
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becomes useless. The first limitation should be that use of ideological voice should reflect a 
conscious decision. While the subconscious certainly reflects our deep-seated beliefs, there 
should be a component of intentionality in order to separate conscious decisions from mere 
instinctive ones. Even intentionality, though, is not a term without its complexities. 
There are three levels of intentionality. The first level would be the unintentional, or 
instinctive. We might also consider acts of subsistence or survival within this group. An example 
in this category might be eating. Eating is a biological imperative. It is not instinctive in the 
sense that, unlike breathing, we must choose to eat and we can forego food for any number of 
reasons. It is necessary for survival, though, and, after acknowledging the necessity of the act 
itself, contains potential layers of meaning. The second level would be the first of those layers 
and it would include generalized decisions focused on the act itself. An example of this type of 
decision would be vegetarianism. I might choose to forego any meat for ideological or health 
reasons (whether they be valid or not). This would reflect an ideological position based upon the 
act of eating itself that reflects a certain belief. An example of decisions on this level that might 
have lesser implications with respect to ideological voice might include basing decisions upon 
taste preference. On the third level, though, I may also make decisions about eating that are not 
centered on the act itself, but by which my decisions relative to the act reflect an ideological 
stance about something extrinsic to consumption. This extrinsic ideology might include 
patronizing a restaurant that donates a portion of its proceeds to a particular charity or one that 
supports a particular cause. 
With respect to the ideological voice, each of these three levels of intentionality reflects 
an increasing potential presence of ideological voice. The first level of instinctive acts possesses 
only a minor possible reflection of ideological voice, if any at all. The second level of 
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intentionality has greater potential to reflect ideological voice in a meaningful way because it 
deals with conscious decisions about things that may or may not reflect ideology. This level can 
be conceived of as a reflection of positive or negative voice. The greatest level of potential 
reflection of ideological voice, however, must be in that third level of intentionality. In a sense, it 
is almost a necessity that this level reflects the most significant and meaningful use of 
ideological voice because it is, by definition, based almost entirely on a decision about 
something other than the ostensible act itself. It is this third level upon which I would like to 
focus. 
As I noted in the Introduction, it is also helpful to contemplate the ideological voice in a 
manner similar to the aural voice. When considering the aural voice, you may consider the actual 
sound, the meaning of the sound, and the mechanisms that produce the sound. Similarly, for the 
ideological voice you can consider the action that someone takes, the ideological position that 
action represents, and the mechanism that enables that action. So, for example, with Tom Waits, 
his actions were to speak out against endorsements and to refuse to do any. The ideological 
position that action represents would be his belief that doing endorsements is selling out and that 
it compromises artistic integrity. The mechanisms that enable that action would include utilizing 
the legal system to protect his ideological position or that his celebrity status provides him with a 
podium upon which to communicate that position to a wide audience. This is the foundation of 
the discursive theory of ideological voice. 
 
Distinguishing the Positive from the Negative 
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Returning to the eating analogy, we can now distinguish between positive and negative 
voice and equate them to ideology in a meaningful way for voice studies. Quite simply, positive 
voice is when you choose a particular path in order to make a statement, while negative voice is 
when you avoid a particular path in order to make a statement. For example, I would be using my 
positive voice if I chose to eat at a restaurant that supported marriage equality while I would be 
using my negative voice if I chose to avoid a restaurant that opposed marriage equality. This 
reflects upon voice because both are ways in which I would be using my actions to reflect my 
voice in an ideological sense. 
For musicians, there are many ways in which they can utilize their ideological voice. 
Bono from U2 has been known to use the platform of his concert stage in order to promote 
causes that he is involved in. I was at a U2 concert in the mid-2000s where he encouraged 
audience members to take out their cell phones and text their name to a certain number to 
demonstrate their support for his One Campaign. Names would then flash across a giant video 
monitor, but every audience member who texted their name was then signed up to receive mass 
text messages from the One Campaign (standard text messaging rates apply, of course). The use 
of positive voice does not have to be so explicit, though. Positive voice can also be implicit, both 
actually and perceived. 
In an actual sense, a musician may be promoting or endorsing a cause by letting his 
music be used by that organization or by appearing as a spokesperson. One of the reasons 
companies hire celebrities, though, is because they hope that the general public will then assume 
that the celebrity endorses that product or organization. In fact, the best possible outcome would 
be for the public to associate that celebrity with the organization. This is where advertisers and 
marketers harness the power of the cultural cohort to drive commerce and take advantage of the 
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perceived implicit positive voice. I say that this is a perceived use of implicit positive voice 
because the musician may not have an opinion about the company or organization and may 
simply be collecting a paycheck. This drives at the heart of why Tom Waits likely opposes 
musicians endorsing products. 
Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, I was unable to obtain my own interview with Mr. 
Waits, but there have been several interviews with Mr. Waits in which he discussed his stance on 
commercials. In a letter that Waits apparently wrote in response to a story in the magazine The 
Nation regarding The Doors’ drummer John Densmore refusing to do commercials, Waits said 
that “artists who take money for ads poison and pervert their songs. It reduces them to the level 
of a jingle, a word that describes the sound of change in your pocket, which is what your songs 
become. Remember, when you sell your songs for commercials, you are selling your audience as 
well.” (Waits 2002) Waits referenced his identity in a New York Times article from 2006 about 
subsequent legal battles with advertisers over sound-alikes when he noted that “it’s part of an 
artist’s odyssey… discovering your own voice and finding the combination of qualities that 
makes you unique. It’s kind of like your face, your identity. Now I’ve got these evil 
doppelgangers out there – my evil twin who is undermining every move I make.” (Sisario 2006, 
E3) His aversion to advertising stems, in part, to his reaction to the only time he ever did a 
commercial about 10 years prior to the Frito Lay case. He noted that he was down on his luck 
and needed the money, but after, he felt artistically like “artistically, I had sold myself down the 
river. I felt I had betrayed something in me.” (United 1990) As Waits himself pointed out in the 
Frito Lay case, the fact that people thought he was singing for a commercial made him look like 
a hypocrite because of this implicit positive voice. Advertisers are taking advantage of this 
implicit positive association with their product in order to drive sales. Waits believes that “your 
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credibility, your integrity and your honor are things no company should be able to buy.” (Waits 
2002) 
Advertising may also be used to help expose musicians to the public and drive musical 
success. One of the most striking examples of this phenomenon is Moby. He licensed all 18 
tracks on his album Play for use in advertising in 2000. Prior to this, he was relatively unknown, 
but his licensing agreements “led to radio airplay that almost certainly would not have been 
conceivable otherwise, and record sales in the millions.”  (Klein 2009, 59) Moby’s tremendous 
success “validated advertising as a launching pad for lesser-known or new musicians in both the 
independent and major label music worlds, where suddenly licensing became seen as not simply 
an extra source of revenue, but a way to break an artist.” (59) 
It is interesting to note that, in my formulation of voice, it is not only possible to use 
negative and positive voice concurrently, but it is almost necessary. If I were to choose not to 
endorse a particular product it could, as with Tom Waits, be because I specifically want to 
distance myself from that particular product or endorsements in general. It could also be because 
they aren’t paying me enough money, that I promised that song to someone else, or any number 
of other possible reasons. When I have utilized my positive voice to speak out on a particular 
issue, though, then my use of negative voice through disassociation relative to that issue becomes 
more explicit and identifiable for what it is. The thing that separates silence from negative voice 
is its association with something else, presumably a use of the positive voice. 
Some of my informants reinforced these ideas in my interviews with them. Tom 
acknowledged that, “identity and reputation are everything in this business,” underscoring the 
importance of artistic integrity and credibility. (Interview, December 19, 2012) Sarah explained 
that, “an image is a big thing. It is. As much as I don’t like to admit that, it just is. And you see it 
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as soon as you’re in the scene.” (Interview, November 10, 2012) While none of my informants 
were as adamantly opposed to endorsement as Waits is, they all expressed a concern about their 
music or voice being used to endorse products that they did not believe in. Sarah further 
explained that, “when I started singing professionally, I made a promise that I would never do 
anything that was not genuine. So I would never become something, be something, sing 
something, wear something that was not me. And I would never put on a mask.” (Interview, 
November 10, 2012) As it relates to endorsement, she stated that, “I’ve gotta like the product and 
it’s gotta genuinely reflect who I am.” (Interview, November 10, 2012) Will summed up my 
contention regarding negative voice succinctly when he told me, “if you don’t want to get 
involved, just keep quiet.” (Interview, January 5, 2013) 
This idea is not without its problems, though. To a certain extent, every “famous” 
musician has been commodified. One common criticism of independent bands with cult 
underground followings that later sign major record deals is that they are “selling out.” This 
implies a type of caving to commercial influence that bears some similarity to Waits’ position on 
endorsements. Is Tom Waits, therefore, a hypocrite because he accepts large amounts of money 
from record companies and movie producers to sing or act in projects with wide commercial 
appeal or is there a difference? Matt addressed this apparent conflict by telling me, “I think the 
concept of paying someone for their art, to use their art, to borrow their art, to whatever, is a 
good concept. I think it needs to be that way.” (Interview, December 29, 2012) The overriding 
issue, then, becomes your conception of the term “art” and how that applies, if at all, to the work 
that a musician is doing. 
I do not believe the answer to the question of whether Waits is already a hypocrite by 
participating in the commercial aspect of the music industry is so simple as to be capable of 
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being theorized here. As with Tom Waits and the use of negative voice, though, it really boils 
down to personal opinion. My role here is not to valuate commercialism or different genres of 
music, but rather to explore how voice is manifested and communicated by musicians and how 
voice ties into and reflects personal identity. The works I have referenced in this thesis make a 
case for the ideas of positive and negative voice and my field interviews support the notion that 
these are concepts that come into play for musicians, both consciously and subconsciously, when 
considering and crafting their own identities. 
As you can see, though, distinguishing between positive and negative voice is not so 
clear-cut because there is usually some degree of overlap along with some measure of 
uncertainty or ambiguity as to whether negative voice is even being used at all. On one hand, 
Dolar reminds us that “not all voices are heard, and perhaps the most intrusive and compelling 
are the unheard voice, and the most deafening thing can be silence.” (Dolar 2006, 14) It is true 
that silence can speak volumes, but it can also say nothing at all. It is important to consider the 
negative voice as a powerful reflection of identity and ideology, though, because there can be no 
doubt that it functions in that way. The negative voice, in a sense, is similar to the idea of 
opportunity cost in economic theory. Opportunity cost would be the value of forgone 
opportunities where negative voice would equate to the value of actually forgoing those 
opportunities. Negative voice, then, becomes a powerful tool that musicians can use to reflect 
their identity to their cultural cohorts and craft their image in a way that best supports their 
personal ideologies. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
I began this thesis by asking what defines a musician. Over the ensuing pages I have 
answered that question, as well as provided some insight as to why it should matter to scholars, 
to musicians, and to the public at large. The legal system, through legislation and the judiciary, 
has instituted a means of redress if musicians have been harmed in any number of ways. The 
most widely known of these means is copyright law, but copyright law, in practice, does not 
really protect musicians. What, then, do musicians hope to protect and how can the law provide 
that protection? Those are the questions that are central to this thesis. 
I began my thesis by discussing identity in general. Identity is a difficult concept to 
define with respect to musicians because of the unique place they hold in society and the many 
layers of identity that exist simultaneously for most musicians. On one hand, there is individual 
identity, which Turino thinks of as the way in which an individual represents himself to himself 
and to others. Turino’s definition is actually more convoluted than that, but what he was trying to 
do is to contemplate all of the conceivable formulations of how an individual and others could 
interact with respect to the individual’s habits and attributes. He further considered the ways in 
which that identity interacts with the social environment: how it influences the social 
environment and how it, in turn, is informed by the social environment. 
Individual identity is further problematic because of the many simultaneous identities that 
an individual possesses, all of which interact with the social environment in different ways, in 
different spheres, and on different levels. I also proposed the ideas of “true” and “perceived” 
identity and discussed some of the difficulties of those ideas. The idea that there can be a “true” 
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you implies that there is something that is objective and verifiable, which is problematic in and 
of itself. Identity, then, is really more about perception than objectively verifiable fact. Even as it 
pertains to identity of the self, there are layers of “real” and “perceived” operating in dialectical 
ways that make identifying a true identity effectively impossible. Identity is self-validating, 
though, in that the instant that we conceive of ourselves in a certain way and act in accordance, 
that becomes a part of the reality of who we are and what our identity is. Our actions take the 
perceived and make it real. 
Individual identity is only part of the equation, though. Collective identity is also a 
presence in the complicated web of the dialectical relationship between identity and the social 
environment. Collective identity involves similarities that function as a unifying theme, if you 
will, for a group. These groups function as cultural or identity cohorts, as Turino would describe 
them. Individuals thought of as leaders by members of these cohorts, then, have something of a 
trickle-down effect on both the collective and individual identities of cohort members in all of 
their complex manifestations, which then influence culture. This is why musicians are so 
significant. 
They act as focal points for cultural and identity cohorts and it is through the use of their 
voice, in both the physical and ideological sense, that they effectuate a profound influence on 
society. This whole discussion, then, is really mainly about negotiations of power and influence 
through the use of voice. 
I then discussed voice as a theoretical construct. While voice can be thought of as the 
physical apparatus that creates sound (a construction of voice that musicians certainly do use), it 
can also be thought of as the message as well as the medium. Beyond just being the message and 
the means by which it is communicated, voice can also be thought of as a marker for credibility 
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and sincerity. Therefore, voice includes a physical production, an ideological belief, and a 
marker of credibility, making it one of the most powerful influences on creation and shaping of 
identity, both individual and collective, and negotiations of power amongst and within 
collectives. 
After discussing identity, I moved into a discussion of copyright law in America in 
general. Copyright is usually thought of as a means of protecting musicians from having their 
music stolen by other people. While this is certainly true, it is also a very basic conception of 
copyright and fails to address many nuances and polemics surrounding copyright law. First, I 
discussed the historical development of copyright law beginning with its origins in Europe and 
extending into modern copyright law in America. Copyright was originally conceived of as a 
means of protecting the right of publishers to copy written works (their right to copy, or 
copyright). The first legislative enactment establishing copyright was the Statute of Anne in 
England, which established the right to copy new written works for 14 years (21 years for 
existing works). The purpose behind copyright was to promote creativity while still allowing 
subsequent authors to utilize existing works to create their own derivative works. It was therefore 
important not just to establish exclusive rights to copy works, but also to limit those rights in 
duration. 
In America, the first copyright statute was the Copyright Act of 1790, which was based 
largely upon the Statute of Anne. This statute remained in effect until the Copyright Act of 1909, 
which was spurred by the need for copyright law to keep pace with developments in technology. 
This statute covered not just written works, but any creative works (including music). Coverage 
under the act lasted for 28 years with the ability to renew the right for an additional 28 years. 
This law was eventually replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976, which is the law that is currently 
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in effect today. Currently, the length of copyright protection extends for the life of the author 
plus 70 years for new works and a fixed 28 years with a 67-year renewal for existing works that 
were under protection at the time the 1976 act took effect. This gradual prolongation from 14 
years to life + 70 years is believed to be the result of lobbying efforts from the major 
corporations holding exclusive rights under copyright law, not the actual authors of the works 
protected by the law. Critics of current copyright law believe that it primarily benefits major 
corporations and stifles creative development. 
As a result of this belief, some musicians have utilized emerging technologies to 
circumvent record companies altogether and avoid copyright protection. Radiohead is the most 
vocal and successful example of this model, but the DIY record industry has evolved to allow 
musicians to create their own recordings and crowdsource their marketing to provide a more 
cost-effective means of publicity and distribution while retaining all copyrights for themselves. 
Additional developments, such as Creative Commons, permits authors to make their works 
available to others for free use for whatever purposes the author chooses (see, for example, the 
Frontispiece of this thesis). While major record companies are still the power players in the 
music production business, these developments have been slowly growing in popularity and 
having an impact on the major labels. 
This all ties back into identity because of the ways in which economic interests and music 
production relate in a dialectical manner with identity. As the power of major recording labels 
has increased, so has their power over musicians and the extent of their benefits under copyright 
law. Concurrently, though, they are currently being assailed by a monster of their own creation. 
Record labels have been so effective at marketing musicians through their identities that the 
musicians have amassed the cultural cache to influence their cohorts and society in general. The 
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economic interest in production has shifted from one of the tangible product to the identity. 
Musicians are now finding a way to parlay that cultural influence into alternative means of 
production and distribution that leave the record company out of the loop and enable musicians 
to reclaim control of their own creations on an increasing basis. We are still a long way from a 
major shift in the power dynamic between record company and musician, but the balance in that 
power dynamic is slowly shifting. 
I then discussed the right of publicity, a judicial creation that is often conflated with 
copyright, but which stands alone as distinct from copyright law. The right of publicity was 
initially conceived of as a way of protecting visual likenesses, but has evolved to encompass 
identity. It has evolved in three phases and I discussed those phases and theorized them as a 
natural evolution rather than a disconnected departure. One of the foundational concerns with 
respect to the right of publicity has as much to do with misleading the public and deception as it 
does with fair compensation for celebrities. 
In the first phase of the right of publicity, courts were concerned with visual 
representations. For example, in a case involving late night talk show host Johnny Carson, a 
portable toilet company had used the famous catch-phrase “Here’s Johnny” in its advertisement 
and Carson sued for right of publicity. The court mentioned identity when rendering its decision, 
but basically the court was considering something fairly tangible, a phrase in this case. The 
court’s decision was based upon Carson’s pecuniary interest in this reflection of his identity and 
the fact that he was not compensated for it. Another example that I did not discuss earlier 
involved a racecar driver who had a distinct vehicle with a unique configuration of decals and 
decorations upon it. A company utilized an image of the car, but removed the number from the 
car and anything containing the driver’s name and used that image in its advertisements. Again, 
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this was a fairly tangible representation that was strongly associated with the driver and the court 
ruled that the company was taking advantage of his fame without properly compensating him. 
The first phase of the right of publicity could then be summarized as protecting tangible 
representations of celebrities from being used without proper compensation. At this point, the 
primary concern was economic. 
In the 1980s, the right of publicity entered its second phase where courts began to 
concern themselves with more intangible interests. One illustrative case representing this 
development involved the Marx Brothers, who sued a production company that produced a play 
where the actors simulated the unique styles of the Marx Brothers. In the Marx case, the court 
recognized the importance of celebrities in the personas they capitalize upon as representations 
to the public. The second phase is most noteworthy because courts began thinking of a 
musician’s persona as something tangible, much as they had considered things like a baseball 
player’s likeness or the unique placement of decals on a racecar driver’s car tangible. The Marx 
case is also noteworthy because it brings the idea of celebrity impersonators into question. If the 
defendants in the Marx case cannot have their actors imitate the unique performance styles of the 
Marx Brothers, how then can celebrity impersonators get away with what they do? Essentially, 
the determining factor is intent. If the intent is to deceive the public and capitalize upon that 
deception, the right of publicity comes into play. If the intent is parody, then the First 
Amendment applies and the representation is protected. 
There are two cases that exemplify the developments of the third phase of the 
development of the right of publicity. The first involved Bette Midler in a case where Midler 
sued Ford Motor Company because they hired a Bette Midler sound-alike to sing one of Midler’s 
famous songs for a commercial after first approaching and being denied by Midler to appear in 
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the commercial herself. The court acknowledged the connection between physical voice and 
identity in finding that this violation of Midler’s very identity constituted grounds for a lawsuit. 
This was the first time a court explicitly held that co-opting a musician’s identity alone was 
sufficient to support a right of publicity claim. 
The second and, arguably, more significant case involved Tom Waits. Waits was 
staunchly opposed to musicians endorsing any products at all, so when he was approached by 
Frito Lay to sing a parody of one of his own songs, he naturally refused. Much as Ford did with 
Midler, Frito Lay then hired a sound-alike to sing the song for the commercial. Waits sued not 
only on pecuniary grounds, but also on ideological grounds. He claimed that listeners might 
think that he was actually singing in the commercial and, his stance on musician endorsements 
being a well-known part of his identity, might question his integrity and credibility. The court 
not only upheld the right of publicity claim, but also upheld an award for mental distress based 
upon Waits’ shock, anger, and embarrassment. This represents the final development in the right 
of publicity and brings us up to today where musicians now enjoy significant protection of their 
identity through judicial doctrine, but not statute. 
This is not to say that there are no statutory means of protecting identity, both at home 
and abroad. After examining the right of publicity, a judicial creation, I went on to consider the 
moral rights doctrine, a legislative one. The moral rights doctrine primarily exists in international 
copyright law (including the Berne Convention) and protects an author’s moral claim to how his 
creation is used. While this law has had purchase in international copyright law for over a 
century, it has gained very little traction in America. Currently, the only type of creation 
protected by the moral rights doctrine is visual art. New York and California both have statutes 
protecting visual art under the moral rights doctrine and these statutes prompted Congress to pass 
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the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which granted moral rights to visual artists on a national 
level. 
While there is no guarantee that moral rights will ever be granted to musicians, I 
examined some reason why that might be on the horizon in America. The first reason I cited was 
the evolution of the right of publicity. As I explained, the right of publicity has gradually evolved 
from protection of a tangible representation, such as a photograph or a distinctive design, into a 
protection of identity and even integrity. The second reason is the enactment of moral rights 
legislation in New York, California, and in federal law protecting visual artists. This 
demonstrates that lawmakers are aware of the importance of protecting an artist’s integrity and 
the very real danger that their integrity will be exploited without sufficient compensation. This 
danger is no less present with musicians as it is for visual artists, so it only goes to follow that 
moral rights will eventually be extended to all forms of creative production just as copyright was 
extended from print materials to music and other forms of creative production. Finally, there is 
the fact that America has now joined the Berne Convention, a set of international rules aimed at 
providing an international framework for copyright enforcement across national borders. 
Economic interests for musicians have shifted from their creative product to their persona 
and identity and the law is adapting in recognition of that shift. Case law has already evolved to 
account for that development, but legislation has been slow to follow suit, as legislation often is. 
There are enough high profile musicians and celebrities now drawing attention to this deficiency 
that lawmakers are becoming aware of the issue and are beginning to address it. This represents a 
fundamental shift in the rights of musicians and has tremendous implications for the creation of 
new music because of the swing in the balance of power between musicians and record 
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companies. Until that shifting environment begins to settle down and work itself out, the primary 
economic interest of most musicians rests in their identity and ideology. 
The final chapter of this thesis explored the way in which musicians use their voice as a 
reflection of their ideology. In theorizing the ideological voice, I introduced the concepts of the 
positive and negative voice. This distinction is important because what we choose to not do can 
often be as telling as what we choose to do. We use our positive voice when we choose an 
affirmative course of action that reflects our ideology in some manner. By affirmative course of 
action, I mean that we choose to act in a manner reflective of that ideology. The negative voice is 
the exact opposite. It comes into play when we choose to forego action because of an ideological 
stance. 
The use of negative voice is most clearly illustrated in the cases involving Bette Midler 
and Tom Waits. For whatever reason, whether it be economic or moral, they chose not to 
endorse certain products. When those companies acted in a manner that might mislead people 
into believing they had endorsed those products, it not only misled the public but it assailed their 
right of disassociation. While the motivation for Midler’s refusal to endorse Ford is unclear, 
there is no such ambiguity in the case of Tom Waits. He had been quite vocal and outspoken in 
his beliefs about artistic integrity as it relates to product endorsement. Frito Lay’s use of a Tom 
Waits sound-alike not only infringed upon his right to control the use of his physical voice, but 
also attacked his integrity within his cultural cohort and within society at large. His integrity was 
so clearly attacked that it warranted an award of not just compensatory damages, but also of 
emotional distress. 
While it is certainly possible to conceive of instances where positive or negative voice 
exist alone, they are most effective when used together. If Tom Waits had not vocally spoken out 
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against musician endorsements, his contention that Frito Lay had damaged his integrity within 
his cultural cohort would be less effective than it was because of his use of positive voice. In a 
sense, it is almost the use of positive voice that enables the recognition and use of negative voice. 
The interplay of these representations of ideology is crucial to protecting a musician’s economic 
interests in their identity. 
Identity is of prime importance to musicians and has become one of the most significant 
economic interests that they possess. It is carefully and consciously crafted and has a strong 
influence on society at large. Musicians go to great lengths to conceive of and cultivate those 
identities, which are fluid and ever-evolving things. Since copyright law has evolved to act as 
more of a protection for the economic interests of big business and less of the economic interests 
of musicians, the law has responded by adapting to provide those protections to musicians. It has 
done so through the development and evolution of the right of publicity and through the moral 
rights doctrine. 
I have attempted to provide a new means of considering voice from an ideological 
perspective by marrying already existing ideas from a number of sources with my own concepts 
with respect to ideological voice. In doing so, I have created a new theoretical framework for 
future studies of ideological voice that can inform future voice studies. Musicians have a 
tendency to focus on their physical body because that is what actually creates their product. As a 
physical manifestation, it naturally becomes a convenient focal point, but it is not the only thing 
that musicians should be conscious of or concerned about. In today’s creative environment, a 
musician’s greatest asset is not talent, but his identity. Drawing attention to this shift in economic 
interest enables scholars to more effectively theorize it and musicians to better protect it. 
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I began this thesis by asking what defines a musician. While I have answered that 
question in a meaningful way, it is only a starting point. This is in part because it is a very 
difficult question with an answer that is as complex as you are willing to make it, but also 
because it is something variable and ever-changing. The theoretical framework I have developed 
here can serve as a starting point for theorizing that question and developing more meaningful 
answers to it that shed a brighter light on the ideological voice and what it means to musicians. It 
is that process that enables musicians to better explore and develop their identities and for 
ethnomusicologists to better understand how that informs their work. 
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